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INTRODUCTION
The private security and military industry has undergone a dramatic
shift over the past decade—from an under-regulated sphere of activity to
one in which an array of self-regulatory schemes has emerged. These regu-
latory initiatives took shape as states, security companies, and the broader
* Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya (IDC), Lauder School of Government,
Diplomacy and Strategy (Ph.D., Tel Aviv University; LL.M., Yale Law School; Diploma in
Legal Studies, University of Oxford; Maıˆtrise in Law, University Paris II Panthe´on-Assas). I
would like to thank the American Society of International Law for inviting me to present this
Article at its 2012 mid-year meeting and the panel’s chair, Professor Laura Dickinson, for her
insightful comments on a first draft; as well as the Institute for National Security and
Counterterrorism at Syracuse University for inviting me to present this paper as part of the
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public recognized the need to clarify the legal framework applicable to
private security and military companies.
Private contractors, once regarded as mercenaries, have over the past
two decades played an increasingly central role in support of modern mili-
taries.1 Reasons for this phenomenon range from budgetary policy to the
need for specialized expertise most readily available in the private sector.2
Given the prominence of private contractors on the modern battlefield, a
consensus has formed around the need to establish standards to govern
the conduct of this increasingly prominent category of non-state actor.3
The industry’s expanding scope of activity and client base—composed of
not only states, but also international organizations, non-governmental or-
ganizations, and multinational corporations operating in volatile environ-
ments—has made regulation an even stronger priority.4 In just a few
years, working jointly with states and civil society, the private security and
military industry5 has developed a sophisticated self-regulatory framework
applicable to its activities.
This framework is characterized by multi-stakeholder initiatives, in-
dustry associations, and corporate codes of conduct. In part because of the
rapid pace at which these mechanisms developed, legal scholars have yet
to assess the normative outcome of emerging self-regulatory frameworks
in the realm of war and security. And yet, the stakes are high—particularly
given the growing presence of private security and military contractors on
and near the battlefield and the increased sensitivity of functions entrusted
to them.6
With the help of GAL-developed benchmarks, this Article assesses
the normative outcome produced by self-regulation in the private security
and military industry for the first time. It also offers a blueprint for the
institutionalization of compliance in the industry—keeping self-regulation
1. See generally Peter W. Singer, Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Mili-
tary Industry (2003).
2. Id.
3. See Daphne´ Richemond-Barak, Regulating War—A Taxonomy in Global Admin-
istrative Law, 22 EURO. J. INT’L L. 1027, 1027–1069 (2011) (discussing the shift in the United
Nation’s position).
4. See id. at 1053.
5. The Swiss Department of Foreign Affairs defines private military and security
companies as “private business entities that provide military and/or security services, irre-
spective of how they describe themselves. Military and security services include, in particular,
armed guarding and protection of persons and objects, such as convoys, buildings and other
places; maintenance and operation of weapons systems; prisoner detention; and advice to or
training of local forces and security personnel.” Switzerland Federal Department of Foreign
Affairs, The Montreux Document on Pertinent International Legal Obligations and Good
Practices for States Related to Operations of Private Military and Security Companies during
Armed Conflict, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS 9 (Aug. 2008), available at http://www.eda.
admin.ch/etc/medialib/downloads/edazen/topics/intla/humlaw.Par.0078.File.tmp/Montreux
%20Broschuere.pdf [hereinafter Montreux Document].
6. See MOSHE SCHWARTZ & JOYPRADA SWAIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40764,
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CONTRACTORS IN AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ: BACKGROUND AND
ANALYSIS, 6 (2011), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R40764.pdf.
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as its core. The issue is not, as critics would have it, that the industry
should not or cannot regulate itself. On the contrary, self-regulation
presents distinct advantages over formal governance in certain circum-
stances—particularly in influencing the behavior of non-state actors.
Reflection upon the achievements of the emerging regulatory frame-
work governing war and security also yields important ramifications for
other industries. The financial sector, in particular, has been engaged in
vibrant debates over whether top-down or bottom-up approaches to regu-
lation produce better results; whether regional regulation by the European
Central Bank is preferable to national regulation; and whether self-regula-
tion should be ruled out altogether, given its failure to prevent the global
financial crisis.7 The innovative approach taken by the private security and
military industry provides valuable insight on the future of self-regulation
and global governance.
Surprisingly, analysis of the innovative and fast-paced regulatory de-
velopments in the private security and military industry has remained lim-
ited. Whenever conducted, it has focused on the nature of self-regulation
as such, with a focus on its “soft” normative character and on the absence
of appropriate oversight.8 This Article advocates a repositioning of the cri-
tique. From a regulatory perspective, the private security and military in-
dustry has succeeded in enhancing transparency and participation—two
important characteristics of successful global governance schemes.9 Any
critique, to be credible, must acknowledge this progress. That said, skep-
tics are correct to say that more needs to be done. This Article seeks to
identify what “more” means in the context of the regulation of the private
military and security industry. First, it means more sanctioning—beyond
the mere expulsion or suspension of non-compliant actors from self-gov-
ernance schemes. Second, it means broadening the reach of the regulation
to individual contractors, alongside state and corporate accountability.
I propose a regulatory model that would achieve these two goals. The
proposed model builds on the industry’s most recent attempt at improving
governance10 as well as on the experience of other globally regulated sec-
7. See, e.g., Alex Cukierman, Reflections on the Crisis and on its Lessons for Regula-
tory Reform and for Central Bank Policies, 7 JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL STABILITY 26, 26
(2011); Eric Helleiner & Stefano Pagliari, The End of Self-Regulation? Hedge Funds and
Derivatives in Global Financial Governance in GLOBAL FINANCE IN CRISIS: THE POLITICS OF
INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY CHANGE 74 (Eric Helleiner, Stefano Pagliari, Hubert Zim-
mermann, eds., 2012).
8. See, e.g., Rene´e de Nevers, (Self) Regulating War?: Voluntary Regulation and the
Private Security Industry, 18 SECURITY STUD. 479, 516 (2009) (“[a]s it is currently configured,
this industry does not lend itself to obligatory self-regulation.”); see also Caroline Holmqvist,
Private Security Companies, The Case for Regulation, STOCKHOLM INT’L PEACE RES. INST.
Paper 9, 50 (2005)(“[T]he same general concern applies here as with many other self-regula-
tion schemes: that such instruments will become (or be perceived as) an alternative to the
development of enforceable (legal) instruments.”).
9. See Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch & Richard Stewart, The Emergence of Global
Administrative Law, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 15, 61 (2005).
10. See PRIVATE SECURITY SERVICE PROVIDER’S ASSOCIATION, INTERNATIONAL
CODE OF CONDUCT FOR PRIVATE SECURITY SERVICE PROVIDER’S ASSOCIATION (2013),
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tors. It consists of a multi-level regulatory regime—combining the use of
national bodies at the monitoring level with the use of an international
body at the sanctioning level. Importantly, it enables monitoring and sanc-
tioning of companies and contractors alike—something none of the pro-
posals currently on the table contemplates.11
Because the emergence of non-traditional regulation in the realm of
war and security has remained largely unnoticed among regulation ex-
perts—and its normative impact largely under-explored by legal experts—
this Article provides the first in-depth attempt at tackling important ques-
tions arising out of this noteworthy regulatory development. Have recent
and groundbreaking steps undertaken in the realm of self-regulation suc-
ceeded in enhancing compliance with the law? How do major industry
players perceive such regulation? Has the private security and military in-
dustry found the right equilibrium?
This Article thus not only in identifies mechanisms best suited to mon-
itor compliance in the private security and military industry, but also de-
signs optimal methods of regulation in global governance more generally.
To the debate over the creation of “hybrid sources of law” by non-state
actors,12 this Article contributes important insights on the feasibility and
the benefits of involving certain non-state actors in international law
making.
I. THE INDUSTRY AS A CASE STUDY IN SELF-REGULATION
Self-regulation in the private security and military industry has devel-
oped at a rapid pace, often beyond the expectations of the industry’s main
actors and observers. It has also advanced faster than other efforts to regu-
late the industry (mainly national and international legislation).13 The key
achievement of self-regulatory schemes lies in the crystallization of indus-
[hereinafter ARTICLES OF ASSOCIATION], available at http://www.icoc-psp.org/uploads/
ICoC_Articles_of_Association.pdf.
11. All existing self-regulatory schemes in the private security and military industry
focus on state and corporate accountability, and contemplate dismissal as the main, if not
only, sanction for non-compliance. See, e.g., International Stability Operations Association,
ISOA Code of Conduct, art. 14.2 (2011) [hereinafter ISOA Code of Conduct], available at
http://www.stability-operations.org/index.php; see also Draft Charter of the Oversight Mech-
anism for the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers, § IX
(F)(2)(b) [hereinafter Draft Charter], available at http://www.icoc-psp.org/uploads/
Draft_Charter.pdf (companies could reapply for admission two years after losing their mem-
bership). Other instruments fail to mention sanctions altogether. See, e.g., Human Rights
Counsel Res. 15/25, Report of the Working Group on the use of mercenaries as a means of
violating human rights and impeding the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determina-
tion, 15th Sess., July 5 2010, U.N. GAOR, 65th Sess., A/HRC/15/25.
12. See, e.g., Anthea Roberts and Sandesh Sivakumaran, Lawmaking by Non-state Ac-
tors: Engaging Armed Groups in the Creation of International Humanitarian Law, 37 YALE J.
INT’L L. 107 (2012).
13. National legislation, though present sporadically, does not suffice. For legislation
efforts, see National regulatory framework on PMSCs, UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS—
OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, http://www.ohchr.org/en/Issues/
Mercenaries/WGMercenaries/Pages/NationalRegulatoryFrameworks.aspx).
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try-wide standards and enhanced mechanisms designed to monitor compli-
ance with these standards. Even if much progress remains to be made to
ensure that non-compliant actors are held accountable, the industry pro-
vides an interesting case study in self-regulation.14
In the private security and military industry, self-regulation15 has
reached beyond what is traditionally regarded as industry regulation.16
Traditional self-regulation—typified by European guilds—is characterized
by industry participants reaching understandings on common goals, ac-
ceptable norms of conduct, and organizational structure. Self-regulation in
the private security and military industry today encompasses both private
regulation and hybrid public-private regulation.17
14. It is important to note that this Article does not analyze how market conditions
affect self-regulation. Rather, it takes an institutional look at self-regulation: that is, the char-
acteristics of self-regulatory schemes and how self-regulation is carried out.
15. Self-regulation covers a wide range of institutional arrangements, with varying de-
grees of governmental autonomy, legal force, and scope within the relevant industry. Self-
regulation may be defined as “policy making by non-legislative public and private actors
independently from political actors’ intervention.” Adrienne He´ritier & Dirk Lehmkuhl, In-
troduction: The Shadow of Hierarchy and New Modes of Governance, 28 J. PUB. POL’Y 1, 3
(2008); see also, Neil Gunningham & Joseph Rees, Industry Self-Regulation: An Institutional
Perspective, 19 J.L. & POL’Y 363, 366 (1997) (defining the difference between self-regulation
and government regulation in terms of “typologies of social control, ranging from detailed
government command and control regulation to ‘pure’ self-regulation, with different points
on the continuum encapsulating various kinds of co-regulation.”); Anthony Ogus, Rethinking
Self-Regulation, 15 OXFORD J.L.STUD. 97, 99–100 (1995) (preferring to refer to self-regula-
tion as “a spectrum containing different degrees of legislative constraints, outsider participa-
tion in relation to rule formulation or enforcement (or both), and external control and
accountability.”).
16. Industry self-regulation may be understood as a common set of understandings
among participants in a particular industry or profession regarding norms of conduct, organi-
zation, limitations on activity, and collective debt. See, e.g., Anil K. Gupta & Lawrence J.
Lad, Industry Self-Regulation: An Economic, Organizational and Political Analysis, 8 ACAD.
OF MGMT. REV. 416, 417 (1983) (defining industry self-regulation as “a regulatory process
whereby an industry-level, as opposed to governmental- or firm-level, organization (such as a
trade association or a professional society) sets and enforces rules and standards relating to
the conduct of firms in the industry.”).
17. I should note that the term “self-regulation”—which has become the term of refer-
ence to describe the emerging regulatory framework in the industry—fails to capture these
subtleties. Self-regulation in the industry finds itself somewhere between enforced self-regu-
lation and voluntary self-regulation (in which the government plays no role at all) on the
regulatory spectrum. On this spectrum, “co-regulation” best accounts for the interesting mix
of public and private authority that has come to characterize the industry’s emerging regula-
tory frameworks. Neither exclusively public nor exclusively private, co-regulation broadly
refers to “self-regulation with some oversight and/or ratification by government.” See Ian
Ayres & John Braithwaite, RESPONSIVE REGULATION 102 (OUP, 1992); see also Gun-
ningham and Rees, supra note 15, at 366; VIRGINIA HAUFLER, A PUBLIC ROLE FOR THE
PRIVATE SECTOR: INDUSTRY SELF-REGULATION IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 112 (Carnegie En-
dowment for International Peace ed., 2001). Ayres and Braithwaite give the example of tri-
partite processes involving public interest groups as an example of co-regulation. In the
private security and military industry, it is the indirect but tangible involvement of states in
convening, promoting and overseeing self-regulation in cooperation with the private security
and military industry that brings the regulatory framework closer to co-regulation. This spe-
cific element—whose importance has been acknowledged by participants in the scheme—has
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I should note that the term “self-regulation”—which has become the
term of reference to describe the emerging regulatory framework in the
industry—fails to capture these subtleties. Self-regulation in the industry
finds itself somewhere between enforced self-regulation and voluntary
self-regulation (in which the government plays no role at all) on the regu-
latory spectrum. On this spectrum, “co-regulation” best accounts for the
interesting mix of public and private authority that has come to character-
ize the industry’s emerging regulatory frameworks. Neither exclusively
public nor exclusively private, co-regulation broadly refers to “self-regula-
tion with some oversight . . . or ratification by government.”18
Examples of private regulation include regulation by industry associa-
tions and the adoption of codes of conduct by individual companies.19 But
the public-private initiatives have probably been most visible—including
an array of notable achievements: the Voluntary Principles on Security and
Human Rights (Voluntary Principles) in 2000;20 the Montreux Document
on Pertinent International Legal Obligations and Good Practices for States
related to Operations of Private Military and Security Companies during
Armed Conflict (Montreux Document) in 2008;21 the International Code
of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers (ICoC) in 2010;22 and the
Charter of the Oversight Mechanism for the International Code of Conduct
for Private Security Providers (Charter) in 2013.23
The multiplication and growing sophistication of self-regulatory
schemes in the industry can be attributed in part to sustained criticism of
contributed to the success of the Montreux Document and the ICoC. See Minutes of the IcoC
Working Group #3 Meeting: June 27, 2011 via Teleconference, ICOC, http://www.icoc-psp.org/
uploads/Minutes_WG_3_June_27.pdf (last visited Nov. 6, 2014) [hereinafter Minutes of the
IcoC Working Group #3 Meeting: June 27, 2011]. In the future, states could contemplate
additional ways to promote co-regulation by, for example, rewarding firms that participate in
these schemes. See Andrew A. King & Michael J. Lenox, Industry Self-regulation without
Sanctions—The Chemical Industry’s Responsible Care Program, 43 ACAD. MGMT. J. 698
(2008). Creating such incentives would only reinforce the impact of co-regulation in the in-
dustry, giving it more bite than self-regulation.
18. See IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION 35 (1992); see
also John Braithwaite, Enforced Self-Regulation: A New Strategy for Corporate Crime Con-
trol, 80 MICH. LAW REV. 1466 (1982) (noting, as an example of co-regulation, tripartite
processes involving public interest groups).
19. See Rene´e De Nevers, The Effectiveness of Self-Regulation by the Private Security
and Military Industry, 30 J. PUB. POL’Y 119, 221 (2010) (“To date, PMSC self-regulation has
relied primarily on codes of conduct established by industry trade associations.”).
20. Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights, VOLUNTARY PRINCIPLES ON
SECURITY & HUM. RTS., http://www.voluntaryprinciples.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/vol-
untary_principles_english.pdf (last visited Nov. 6, 2014) [hereinafter Voluntary Principles].
21. See Montreux Document, supra note 5; see also, e.g., Daphne´ Richemond-Barak,
Regulating War: A Taxonomy in Global Administrative Law, 22 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1027 (2011)
[hereinafter Richemond-Barak].
22. See International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers, ICOC
(Nov. 9, 2010), http://www.icoc-psp.org/uploads/INTERNATIONAL_CODE_OF_
CONDUCT_Final_without_Company_Names.pdf [hereinafter ICoC].
23. See id.
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alleged abuses, lack of oversight and accountability, and general public
disapproval of outsourcing core military and security functions.24 In this
climate, industry players sought a way to gain legitimacy by showing that
they were bound by certain norms of conduct.25 The absence of a readily
applicable regulatory framework made this goal difficult to achieve.26 Do-
mestic legal systems had long failed to provide a solution: whenever one
state regulated the outsourcing of private security and military services,
companies would simply choose to operate from another.27 At least theo-
retically, formal avenues of international regulation (chiefly via the United
Nations) would seem to be best placed to regulate such activity. However,
in practice, formal avenues could not keep track with the unprecedented
growth of the industry in the last two decades.28 Taken together, the inad-
equacy of a solely domestic approach and the slow international response
provided fertile terrain for self-regulation to emerge.
As self-regulation in the industry gained momentum, states and supra-
national organizations sought to influence its direction and substance.29
States have not only participated in but also initiated self-regulatory
processes—often in cooperation with private actors (such as intergovern-
mental organizations and non-governmental organizations).30 This was the
case, for example, when the Swiss government and the International Com-
mittee of the Red Cross joined forces to build the multi-stakeholder initia-
tive that evolved into the so-called Montreux Document.31 The
involvement of other states only increased the impetus for companies to
become involved, later joined by NGOs.32 Together, they wanted to de-
velop international standards for the operation of private security and mil-
itary companies in complex and highly volatile environments, and improve
oversight and accountability of these actors. The initiative gained support
in a relatively short time: as of March 2014, fifty states and three interna-
tional organizations had signed on to the Montreux Document,33 and over
24. See, European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission),
Report on Private Military and Security Firms and Erosion of the State Monopoly on the Use
of Force, Adopted by the Venice Commission at its 79th Plenary Session, 29 June 2009, para.
8.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Efforts to draft an international treaty have failed to produce any tangible results.
Similarly, national states have not adopted particularly effective steps designed to regulate
the outsourcing of private security and military services.
29. See discussion at Part I.A, infra.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. See The Montreux Document on private military and security companies, SWITZER-
LAND FED. DEP’T FOREIGN AFF., http://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/home/topics/intla/humlaw/
pse/psechi.html.
33. The document was jointly finalized by 17 states (Afghanistan, Angola, Australia,
Austria, Canada, China, France, Germany, Iraq, Poland, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sweden,
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, Ukraine, and the United States of America), and later
780 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 35:773
700 companies had signed on to the widely accepted industry code known
as the ICoC.34
The reach of self-regulation thus stands out in the context of the pri-
vate security and military industry—particularly when contrasted with
other modes of more formal administration. In the broader context of self-
regulation generally, too, the experience of the private security and mili-
tary industry stands out. The pace at which self-regulation emerged, the
active role played by industry associations, and the broad-based consensus
self-regulation has generated among public and private actors alike35 are
noteworthy.36 The innovative approach taken by the industry thus de-
serves more attention than it has received so far from regulatory experts.
Objections to the use of this industry as a case study can be expected.
The private security and military industry hardly resembles other and
more traditional self-regulated sectors, such as the chemical industry, the
securities industry, or advertising. War and security constitute prerogatives
of the state par excellence, and entail restrictions to human dignity and
human freedom. Comparing telecommunications to war may thus seem
problematic. Although curtailment of human dignity, life, and freedom by
a profit-making enterprise has in some instances hindered the privatiza-
tion of prisons such concerns have not hindered security and military out-
sourcing. Even in countries where the privatization of prisons has been
limited, such as Israel, it is unlikely that the rationale for outlawing prisons
could be extended to war and security.37 More generally, the growth of the
private security and military industry has marked the onset of the transfor-
mation of war into a business (almost) like any other. With private security
and military firms operating on almost all battlefields and performing an
increasingly broad array of functions on states’ behalf, the state no longer
holds an absolute monopoly on war and security. So much so that objec-
tions related to the sui generis nature of this industry should be dismissed.
I present three types of self-regulatory initiatives undertaken in the
private security and military industry: multi-stakeholder initiatives, indus-
try associations, and company codes of conduct. Though different in na-
ture, all three types of initiatives share certain basic characteristics. They
signed on by another 33. See http://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/home/topics/intla/humlaw/pse/
parsta.html.
34. See Participating States of the Montreux Document, SWITZERLAND FED. DEP’T
FOREIGN AFF., http://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/home/topics/intla/humlaw/pse/parsta.html
(last modified Feb. 21, 2014); see also The International Code of Conduct for Private Security
Service Providers Signatory Companies, CODE , http://www.icoc-psp.org/uploads/Signatory_
Companies_-_August_2013_-_Composite_List2.pdf (last visited Nov. 6, 2014).
35. See Gupta & Lad, supra note 16, at 421 (describing the appeal of self-regulation
when it offers benefits to the industry as a whole).
36. Openly pursuing and developing regulation, such associations “embody contrary
tendencies—the push of self-serving economic (or political) interests and the pull of moral
aspirations.” See Gunningham & Rees, supra note 15, at 373.
37.  See HCJ 2605/05 Academic Center of Law and Business v. Minister of Finance,
[Nov. 19, 2009] (Isr.); and Daphne´ Richemond-Barak, Rethinking Private Warfare, 5 Law and
Ethics of Human Rights 159, 171 (2011).
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are voluntary; they have evolved at a rapid pace over the past decade; they
tend to be transnational; and they are non-binding on their participants.
Because I have analyzed elsewhere the industry’s fragmented regula-
tory framework,38 my discussion here is brief and will focus primarily on
recent developments, before moving on to an assessment of the normative
outcome produced by emerging self-regulatory schemes.
A. Multi-Stakeholder Initiatives
Multi-stakeholder initiatives are characterized primarily by the joint
involvement of public and private actors. In the private security and mili-
tary industry, multi-stakeholder initiatives have generally been undertaken
by a combination of governments, private military companies, industry as-
sociations, and non-governmental organizations. The most notable of the
multi-stakeholder initiatives undertaken to date are the Voluntary Princi-
ples (2000), the Montreux Document (2008), the ICoC (2010),39 and the
recent Charter (2013).
Chronologically, the Voluntary Principles were the first to affect the
industry. Initiated by the British Foreign & Commonwealth Office and the
U.S. Department of State, today the Voluntary Principles counts thirty-
eight participants—including states, companies, and NGOs.40 Companies
in the extractive industry have used the Voluntary Principles to ensure the
safety and security of their operations in volatile environments while also
respecting human rights and humanitarian law.41 In particular, the Volun-
tary Principles set forth a set of standards guiding the conduct of compa-
nies and their personnel in the use of private security services. 42 These
standards—ranging from the use of force to the vetting and training of
contractors—must be incorporated in contracts between participating
companies and private security service providers.
Most importantly for our purposes, the Voluntary Principles contem-
plate monitoring at two levels to guarantee compliance with the stan-
dards.43 At the company level, the Voluntary Principles encourage
investigations into allegations of abusive or unlawful acts, as well as disci-
plinary measures sufficient to prevent and deter wrongdoing.44 In addi-
tion, the Voluntary Principles call for signatory companies to establish
procedures for reporting allegations of wrongdoing to relevant local law
enforcement authorities.45 This two-pronged monitoring mechanism—dis-
38. See Richemond-Barak, supra note 21.
39. See ICoC, supra note 22; see also Richemond-Barak, supra note 21 (further elabo-
rating this mode of governance in the industry).
40. Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights, http://www.voluntary
principles.org/ (last visited Nov. 6, 2014) (showing that as of March 2014, the Voluntary Prin-
ciples cover 8 states, 9 NGOs, and 23 companies).
41. See id.
42. See id.
43. See id. ¶ 4.
44. See id.
45. See id.
782 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 35:773
ciplinary measures within each company, paired with the potential to re-
sort to public authorities—goes beyond the company itself. However, the
Voluntary Principles fall short of establishing a dedicated sanctioning
body, relying instead on the companies.
The next and most significant initiative was launched by Switzerland
and the International Committee of the Red Cross in 2006. This multi-
stakeholder initiative represented the first concrete attempt at clarifying
the legal framework applicable to the provision of security and military
services. It quickly expanded to include other states, international and
non-governmental organizations, and industry leaders. The Swiss initiative
consisted of extensive consultations among the various actors, leading to
the adoption of the Montreux Document in 2008.46 Non-binding but far-
reaching,47 the Montreux Document recalls states’ existing obligations
under humanitarian law and human rights law. It also establishes “good
practices” primarily for states but also for companies and their person-
nel.48 Like the Voluntary Principles, the Montreux Document recom-
mends the use of contracts to enhance compliance with agreed-upon
standards.49
Though less ground-breaking in the realm of monitoring than the Vol-
untary Principles (it contemplates monitoring only at the company level—
and no referral to law enforcement authorities), the Montreux Document
broke new ground by setting clear and comprehensive industry standards
acceptable to all industry players.50 Perhaps most importantly, the Mon-
46. See Montreux Document, supra note 5.
47. See James Cockayne, Regulating Private Military and Security Companies: The
Content, Negotiation, Weaknesses and Promise of the Montreux Document, 13 J. CONFLICT
SECURITY L. 401, 404, 405 (2008) (noting that the Montreux Document’s good practices are
best understood as “a non-exhaustive compendium of illustrative good practice for states
discharging their existing obligations.” This is in contrast with the first part of the Montreux
Document, Cockayne adds, which “provides a conservative statement of lex lata.”)
48. While Part I of the Montreux Document is entitled “Pertinent International Legal
Obligations Relating to Private Security and Military Companies.” Part II—reflecting its de
lege ferenda character—is titled “Good Practices Relating to Private Security and Military
Companies.” See Montreux Document, supra note 5.
49. Montreux Document, supra note 5, art. 14.
50. The Montreux Document was received warmly by states, the United Nations, and
the industry. In addition to the 17 states that participated in the drafting of the Montreux
Document, 29 more states have expressed support to the Montreux Document since its re-
lease. See Participating States of the Montreux Document, SWITZERLAND FED. DEP’T FOR-
EIGN AFF., http://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/home/topics/intla/humlaw/pse/parsta.html (last
modified Feb. 21, 2014). The U.N. General Assembly and Security Council endorsed the
Montreux Document and circulated it to member states in a joint resolution. See U.N. Secur-
ity Council, Letter Dated 2 October 2008 from the Permanent representative of Switzerland
to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/63/467-S/2008/636
(October 6, 2008). At the time, the British Association of Private Security Companies noted
on its website that it would ensure that the good practices of the Montreux Document are
reflected in the future regulations issued by the association. Moreover, the BAPSC (the Brit-
ish Association of Private Security Companies) qualified the adoption of the Montreux Doc-
ument as “a milestone that clarifies the applicable law and thus contributes to strengthening
compliance with [international humanitarian law] and respect for human rights.” See http://
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treux Document served as a platform for the development of other self-
regulatory initiatives within the industry.
Building on the success of the Montreux Document, the next stage in
the development of industry-wide standards was to take the principles ex-
pounded therein (which, as noted, focused on states signatories) and have
them endorsed by individual companies which would undertake to apply
them. This was achieved through the adoption of the International Code of
Conduct for Security Service Providers.51 Adopted by fifty-eight compa-
nies at the time of its drafting in 2010, the ICoC now includes over 700
signatory companies.52 The ICoC is to the private sector what the Mon-
treux Document is to states. Both the Montreux Document and the ICoC
were convened by the Swiss government in consultation with a mix of pub-
lic and private stakeholders – strengthening the continuity and comple-
mentarity between the two instruments. In fact, by virtue of their
acceptance of the ICoC, companies ‘endorse the principles of the Mon-
treux Document’ and agree to standards guiding the exercise of their
functions.53
Like the Montreux Document, the main objective of the ICoC is to set
standards. It hopes to “set forth a commonly agreed set of principles for
[private security providers] and to establish a foundation to translate those
principles into related standards as well as governance and oversight
mechanisms.”54 It succeeds in establishing standards in areas such as
recruiting, subcontracting, and the use of force. Unlike the Montreux Doc-
ument, however, the ICoC goes beyond standard setting, and prepares the
stage for the establishment of enforcement mechanisms.55 Signatory com-
panies are required to:
work with states, other Signatory Companies, Clients, and other
relevant stakeholders after initial endorsement of this Code to,
within 18 months . . . [e]stablish external independent mechanisms
for effective governance and oversight, which will include Certifi-
cation of Signatory Companies’ compliance with the Code’s prin-
ciples and the standards derived from the Code, beginning with
adequate policies and procedures, Auditing and Monitoring of
www.bapsc.org.uk/key_documents-swissInitiative.asp. See also David Isenberg, Dogs of War:
Bursting the Unaccountability Myth, UPI (Oct. 10, 2008), http://www.upi.com/Emerging_
Threats/2008/10/10/Dogs-of-War-Busting-the-unaccountability-myth/UPI-37961223666832/
(noting that the recommendation not to use contractor for activities requiring the use of
force has raised some objections, but that the IPOA has welcomed the adoption of the Mon-
treux Document and indicated that some of its members have begun implementing the “good
practices”).
51. ICoC, supra note 22.
52. See Participating States of the Montreaux Document, supra note 34.
53. Id. ¶ 3.
54. Id. ¶ 5.
55. Id. pmbl. (7); see also pmbl. (8) (noting that the ICoC was conceived as “the first
step in a process toward[ ] full compliance” which would include a “governance and oversight
mechanism”).
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their work in the field, including Reporting, and execution of a
mechanism to address alleged violations of the Code’s principles
or the standards derived from the Code.56
To fulfill this important goal, the ICoC set up a tripartite Steering Com-
mittee and three working groups to work on assessment, reporting, and
internal and external oversight; third party complaints; and the indepen-
dent governance and oversight mechanism.57 By including industry, civil
society, and government representatives, the Steering Committee and its
working groups signified an unprecedented cooperation among these dis-
parate groups. Following lengthy deliberations and consultations, the
Steering Committee and its working groups delivered the Draft Charter of
the Oversight Mechanism for the International Code of Conduct for Private
Security Providers.58 The final document, the Charter, constitutes the third
and important step in a process that began only four years earlier with the
adoption of the Montreux Document.59
The Charter embodies the industry’s most recent and tangible attempt
to date to “promote, govern, and oversee implementation of the [ICoC]
and to promote the responsible provision of security services and respect
for human rights and national and international law in accordance with the
Code.”60 Like the Montreux Document and the ICoC, the Charter was
elaborated under the auspices of the Swiss government and in cooperation
with all three stakeholder groups.
The participatory element permeates the entire Charter, from the ad-
mission of companies, to the composition of its organs and decision-mak-
ing processes. Member companies, civil society organizations, and states
may discuss matters of regulation and make non-binding recommenda-
tions.61 This type of informal horizontal arrangement is a welcome addi-
tion to the regulatory framework—which has so far lacked transnational
networks and coordination arrangements.62 The Board of Directors, which
is responsible for enforcing the ICoC, also comprises members from all
56. See id.
57. See Concept Paper: Areas Requiring Further Consideration for the ICoC (2011),
available at http://www.icoc-psp.org/uploads/TSC_Concept_Paper-final_2011May.pdf.
58. Though I refer to this document as the Draft Charter, it is sometimes referred to as
“IGOM.” See supra note 11 (the document was adopted in 2012 and it has since then been
replaced by the Articles of Association. See ARTICLES OF ASSOCIATION, supra note 10); see
also Explanatory Note on the Draft Charter of the Oversight Mechanism for the International
Code of Conduct for Private Security Providers, ICOC, http://www.icoc-psp.org/uploads/
Explanatory_Note.pdf (last visited Nov. 6, 2014) [hereinafter Explanatory Note] (indicating
that the oversight mechanism was developed over twelve months of work, during which the
steering committee held eighteen meetings, and the working groups held twenty-six meetings
over the course of the summer 2011).
59. See Draft Charter, supra note 11.
60. See id. art. 2.
61. See id. art 6.2.
62. See Richemond-Barak, supra note 21, at 1040.
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stakeholder groups.63 The ICoC encourages participation of civil society
organizations and states in the scheme, alongside companies. Civil society
organizations may participate provided they have “a demonstrated institu-
tional record at the local, national, or international level of the promotion
and protection of human rights, international humanitarian law or the rule
of law.”64 States and intergovernmental organizations may also participate
in the scheme if they have expressed support for the Montreux Document
and have committed to participate in relevant meetings and events.65
(That conditions are imposed upon states to participate in the process
reveals the extent to which the role of the state as a regulator has
changed—a point on which Part IV elaborates further.)
When joining in, companies do not yet accede to full membership sta-
tus. Until they are certified—a process designed to assess whether the
companies’ policies meet the ICoC’s principles and confirm that compa-
nies monitor compliance with the code properly66—companies only enjoy
provisional membership. Member companies have ongoing reporting obli-
gations and must thereafter subject themselves to independent auditing
and verification of their performance.67
Allegations of violations of the ICoC may be submitted by way of
“fair and accessible grievance procedures that offer effective remedies.”68
The Charter envisages a complaint mechanism, allowing any party having
suffered harm as a result of an ICoC violation by a member company to
lodge a complaint.69 Sanctions taken against non-compliant companies, as
deemed necessary by the Board, may include the suspension or the termi-
nation of a company’s membership.70 The decision to sanction also in-
volves all three groups of stakeholders: eight Board members must vote in
favor of sanctions, including at least two representatives of each stake-
holder group (companies, civil society, and governments).71
Much has been accomplished in the realm of governance in the indus-
try—from the Voluntary Principles to the adoption of more visible, broad-
based, and sophisticated multi-stakeholder initiatives. Both the Montreux
Document and the ICoC succeeded in elaborating industry-wide stan-
dards, which the Charter seeks to have implemented through the creation
of certification and monitoring mechanisms. The Montreux process not
63. See Draft Charter supra note 11, art. 7.2.
64. See id. art.  3.3.3.
65. See id. art. 3.3.2.
66. See id. art. 11. The certification process has yet to be fully worked out. Once ob-
tained, certification remains valid for three years (Art. 11.3).
67. See id. art. 12.
68. See id. art. 13.1.
69. See id. art. 13.2.1.
70. See id. art. 13.2.7. Note that under the Charter, the company was prohibited from
reapplying to the Mechanism for two years unless otherwise determined by the Board. Id.
§ IX (F)(2)(b). This provision does not exist in the Articles of Association—which mentions
suspension or termination without any further detail.
71. See id. art. 7.6.
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only united the industry but also achieved an outcome deemed relatively
satisfactory outside the industry. While success is not a foregone conclu-
sion—the contemplated monitoring mechanism remains insufficient,
under-developed, and unimplemented—it nevertheless represents a
groundbreaking attempt at institutionalizing compliance with agreed-upon
standards.
B. Industry Associations
Alongside the major progress made by multi-stakeholder initiatives,
industry associations have assumed a growing role in developing and pro-
moting self-regulation. This change carries significance, as industry as-
sociations are best placed to establish baseline standards, educate, provide
commonality of norms, and create peer pressure—contributing to the in-
ternalization of these norms at the industry level. But the potential of in-
dustry associations as regulators was not readily apparent at first. Early
on, the role of associations was limited to serving as a forum of discussion
on issues of common interest. With time, industry associations became in-
strumental to the elaboration of a common set of standards by requiring
all members of a given association to subscribe to a code of conduct.72
Though industry codes are generally not enforceable, they contain moral
standards used to guide the corporate behavior of the member
companies.73
Industry associations have also, and perhaps most importantly, helped
move self-regulation forward by participating in multi-stakeholder initia-
tives. The largest association is also the one that has been most involved in
shaping regulation. Formerly known as the International Peace Opera-
tions Association, the International Stability Operations Association
(ISOA)74 boasts forty-six members, including industry leaders DynCorp
International and Olive Group.75 The association has assisted the elabora-
tion of industry standards since its creation in 2001, including in the devel-
opment and drafting of the ICoC.76 The ISOA also works to promote and
72. See Surabhi Ranganathan, Between Complicity and Irrelevance? Industry Associa-
tions and the Challenge of Regulating Private Security Contractors, 141 GEO. J. INT’L L. 303
(2010) (analyzing the influence of industry associations in the industry).
73. See generally Ju¨rgen Friedrich, Codes of Conduct in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (OUP, 2008); see also Mark Schwartz, The Nature of the
Relationship between Corporate Codes of Ethics and Behavior, 32 J. BUS. ETHICS 247
(2001)(explaining that codes developed by industry associations usually go beyond, but do
not substitute themselves for, existing legislation). See, e.g., Nils Rosemann, CODE OF CON-
DUCT: TOOL FOR SELF-REGULATION OF PRIVATE MILITARY AND SECURITY COMPANIES 5
(Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2008).
74. International Stability Operations Association: IPOA’s New Name, PR NEWSWIRE
(Oct. 25, 2010), http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/international-stability-operations-
association-ipoas-new-name-105686208.html.
75. See INTERNATIONAL STABILITY OPERATIONS ASSOCIATION, http://www.stability-
operations.org/index.php (presenting a list of ISOA members).
76. See Code of Conduct for Private Security Companies, INTERNATIONAL STABILITY
OPERATIONS ASSOCIATIONS, http://www.stability-operations.org/?International_COC.
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improve existing regulatory instruments applicable to the industry. It
prides itself on being “absolutely committed to raising the bar for profes-
sionalism, standards and ethics across the private sector . . . and actively
participat[ing] in activities such as the development of the International
Code of Conduct for Private Security Companies.”77
A major contribution of the ISOA to industry regulation has been its
code of conduct, which members of the association must abide by.78 The
code elaborates standards applicable to ISOA members operating in con-
flict and post-conflict environments, regardless of location.79 Though not
legally binding, the code positions itself as a law-infused document:
Signatories will be guided by all pertinent rules of international
humanitarian and human rights laws including as set forth in: Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), Geneva Conventions
(1949), Convention Against Torture (1975), Protocols Additional
to the Geneva Conventions (1977), Chemical Weapons Conven-
tion (1993), Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights
(2000), Montreux Document on Private Military and Security
Companies (2008), International Code of Conduct for Private Se-
curity Providers (2010), UK Bribery Act (2010).80
The association’s code of conduct calls on its members to report serious
infractions to relevant authorities81 and to cooperate with official investi-
gations.82 Individuals and organizations may lodge complaints against an
ISOA member for violations of the ISOA code of conduct.83 Regrettably,
the sanction for non-compliance remains limited to dismissal from the as-
sociation.84 Under its most recent iteration, the code also requires ISOA
members to “maintain the standards laid down in the ISOA Code of Con-
duct in addition to the standards and provisions of Signatories’ codes of
conduct.”85 This provision echoes the trend toward the adoption of indi-
77. See Advocacy Initiatives, INTERNATIONAL STABILITY OPERATIONS ASSOCIATION,
http://www.stability-operations.org/?page=advocacy.
78. For the thirteenth version of the Code of Conduct, see ISOA Code of Conduct,
supra note 11 (The original version of the Code was adopted in 2001 and the most recent
version of the Code was adopted in 2011.); see also Richemond-Barak, supra note 21 (provid-
ing more information on the Code).
79. See ISOA Code of Conduct, supra note 11, pmbl.
80. See id.
81. See ISOA Code of Conduct, supra note 11, § 3.3.
82. Id. § 3.2.
83. Complaints must be lodged by submitting a form to the association’s Chief Liaison
Officer of the Standards Committee, who is an employee of the ISOA and is not affiliated
with any company. See Standards Complaint Form Submission, INTERNATIONAL STABILITY
OPERATIONS ASSOCIATION, http://www.stability-operations.org/?page=complaint_Form&hh
SearchTerms=%22complaint%22; see also How to Submit a Standard Complaint, INTERNA-
TIONAL STABILITY OPERATIONS ASSOCIATION, http://www.stability-operations.org/?page=
standards_Complaint.
84. See ISOA Code of Conduct, supra note 11, § 14.2.
85. See id. § 14.1(emphasis added).
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vidual codes of conduct by companies. Over a decade after it came into
existence, the association has come to view itself not only as the guardian
of its code of conduct, but also as the body best placed to ensure that
companies abide by their own internal codes and regulations. Ultimately,
the ISOA’s experience suggests that industry associations could play a role
in regulating self-regulation in the industry.86
In parallel to the Washington-based ISOA, its UK equivalent BAPSC
(the British Association of Private Security Companies) played an impor-
tant role.87 Like the ISOA, its impact on self-regulation was twofold: first,
by way of its code of conduct,88 and, second, due to its involvement in
regulatory initiatives such as the Montreux process.89
C. Company Codes of Conduct
A third level of internalization—beyond the multi-stakeholder initia-
tives and the industry-led efforts detailed above—is illustrated by the
adoption of company codes of conduct.90 These codes generally incorpo-
rate the principles expounded by the multi-stakeholder initiatives and
echo the views of industry associations. Through its adoption of codes of
conduct, and by virtue of its involvement in multi-stakeholders initiatives,
the private sector has positioned itself as an agent of regulation.91
The broader context of global governance has seen mixed reactions to
codes of conduct. Critics argue that these codes of conduct amount to no
more than window dressing: “self-serving industry rhetoric” with no real
effect on the behavior of industry players.92 This cynicism attaches to self-
regulation generally, which is perceived as a public relations scheme de-
signed to make the industry “look good” and bring more business.93 More
nuanced assessments acknowledge that certain codes “are remarkably ef-
86. See Gupta & Lad, supra note 16, at 416.
87. See Andrew Bearpark & Sabrina Schulz, The Future of the Market, in FROM MER-
CENARIES TO MARKET 240, 247 (Simon Chesterman & Chia Lehnardt, eds., 2007). It is im-
portant to note that a third Iraq-based association (the Private Security Company
Association of Iraq) was dismantled in late 2011. The association’s website notes that “[t]he
PSCAI was an industry-driven response to a highly ambiguous environment in the war-torn
Iraq. Now, with the complete departure of [U.S.] [f]orces, and the direct oversight of PSCs by
the Government of Iraq, the need for the PSCAI has withered.” See PRIVATE SECURITY
COMPANY ASSOCIATION OF IRAQ, http://www.pscai.org/ (last visited Nov. 6, 2014).
88. See id.
89. See The British Association of Private Security Companies, BAPSC, http://www.
bapsc.org.uk/?keydocuments=Swiss-initiative.
90. Note that although companies sometimes referred to them as codes of ethics, I will
use the expression “codes of conduct”—it being understood that I include codes of ethics as
well.
91. See Richemond-Barak, supra note 21, at 1062.
92. Gunningham & Rees, supra note 15, at 380.
93. HAUFLER, supra note 17 (debating whether self-regulation is just “talk” and ulti-
mately arguing that it is not because self-regulation does indeed change behavior, though
“evidence is scattered and difficult to analyze systematically.”).
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fective in guiding and controlling industry conduct . . . and that most
others probably fall somewhere in between.”94
In the context of the private security and military industry, the impact
of company codes has evolved over the years. While in the past codes
merely set forth standards and best practices, today they increasingly pro-
vide for internal—and, in some cases, even external—mechanisms de-
signed to ensure compliance. Companies have also updated or modified
their code of conduct to account for developments in the industry—such
as the adoption of the ICoC.95 Most recently, companies have begun out-
sourcing the task of monitoring compliance with the codes to third parties.
Industry leaders such as Aegis and DynCorp, for example, have entered
into relationships with EthicsPoint to this end.96
These changes indicate that (self-)regulation has become a concern for
companies in the industry. Companies have adjusted their approach to
regulation as their needs, clients, activities, and the regulation itself have
evolved. Like the industry itself, self-regulation in the industry constantly
transforms itself, and company codes have played a central role in and as a
result of this evolution. Ironically, with time, the success of these codes
might bring their demise—as the industry standards that they have helped
develop gain broad acceptance.97
This seems to be the case with Erinys, a small security contractor
founded in 2002 and best known for its involvement in the reconstruction
of Iraqi oil infrastructure. Until the adoption of the ICoC, Erinys had one
of the most sophisticated internal sanctioning schemes in the industry.98
Erinys’ code mandated employees to report breaches of the code through
the management chain.99 Non-compliant employees were to be surren-
dered to appropriate authorities and were subject to dismissal from the
company. The sanction for violating the code, in other words, was not lim-
ited to dismissal from the company but also included the involvement of
external authorities. This two-level sanctioning mechanism—reminiscent
94. Gunningham & Rees, supra note 15, at 380 (citing JOSEPH REES, HOSTAGES OF
EACH OTHER: THE TRANSFORMATION OF NUCLEAR SAFETY SINCE THREE MILE ISLAND
(Chicago University Press, 1994)).
95. See infra Part II.B.2 (discussion of Erinys). Additional examples of companies that
modified their codes of conduct in the wake of the ICoC’s adoption include Aegis, Hart
Security, DynCorp, Triple Canopy, and Edinburgh International.
96. Richemond-Barak, supra note 21, at 1066–67; see, e.g., EthicsPoint—Aegis De-
fense, AEGIS, https://secure.ethicspoint.com/domain/media/en/gui/27925/index.html (last
visited Nov. 6, 2014); see also, e.g., EthicsPoint—DynCorp International, DYNCORP INTER-
NATIONAL, https://secure.ethicspoint.com/domain/media/en/gui/27481/index.html (last visited
Nov. 6, 2014).
97. Instead of adopting their own internal code of conduct, companies now often refer
to the ICoC or the ISOA as the applicable instrument summarizing the standards with which
they comply. Examples of such companies include Hart Security, Erinys, Janus Security, or—
for the IPOA/ISOA—New Century Corp.
98. ERINYS INTERNATIONAL, ERINYS CODE (2008). The scheme is no longer in force
having been replaced by a reference to the ICoC.
99. Id. § 3.2.
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of the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights100—constituted
one of the better implementations of an internal sanctioning scheme in the
private security and military industry. Erinys’ subsequent reliance on the
ICoC (which does not contemplate this two-level sanctioning mechanism
and is thus arguably weaker than Erinys’ own code in global governance
terms) raises at least two questions. The first one, mentioned above, per-
tains to the future of company codes as industry standards receive broader
acceptance. The second question, developed further in Part II, relates to
the impact of participation on standard setting. The case of Erinys suggests
that in rare cases where companies set up stringent internal mechanisms,
the adoption of broad-based industry regulations may have the unfortu-
nate effect of lowering applicable standards.
Perhaps most importantly, the experience of Erinys demonstrates that
companies can take regulation seriously and periodically reevaluate their
approach to regulation. The experience of Triple Canopy, a U.S. company
providing security and risk management services to the oil and gas sector,
further illustrates how companies have adapted to changing regulatory de-
velopments.101 In the wake of the ICoC’s adoption, Triple Canopy under-
took a complete revision of its code of conduct.102 The revised code
acknowledges the adoption of the ICoC,and states that “[a]s a signatory to
the ICoC, Triple Canopy must follow the ICoC’s guidance, and the Com-
pany must ensure that it operates in accordance with the standards and
principles it contains.”103 Though the company notes that most of the
ICoC standards and principles were reflected in the Company’s operations
even prior to the ICoC’s adoption, the company calls on employees to
report any actual or suspected violation of the ICoC.104
A number of additional features of Triple Canopy’s revised code are
worth mentioning, as they show the regulatory potential of company
100. See Voluntary Principles, supra note 20.
101. See Triple Canopy, http://www.triplecanopy.com (last visited Nov. 6, 2014). Triple
Canopy was created in 2003 and contracted for over $100 million with the U.S. State Depart-
ment for the provision of personal and guard services.
102. See Triple Canopy, Code of Ethics and Business Conduct (5th rev. 2012), http://
www.triplecanopy.com/assets/tc-ethics-business-conduct-02212012-WEB_new.pdf [hereinaf-
ter Triple Canopy Code]. The fifth and most recent revision dates to late 2011, following the
adoption of the ICoC. The revised Code entered into force in February 2012. See
Richemond-Barak, supra note 21, at 1065-66, for a description and analysis of the compliance
program, which has not been significantly modified. It should be noted that Triple Canopy’s
commitment to law and regulation also finds expression in “an organizational—wide human
rights policy” in which the company declares that its business conduct will be guided by
the U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Chemical Weapons Convention, the
Convention against Torture, the Geneva Conventions (including Protocols Additional to the
Geneva Conventions), and the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights. Human
Rights—Respecting the Communities We Serve, TRIPLE CANOPY, http://www.triplecanopy.
com/philosophy/human-rights/ (last visited Nov. 6, 2014).
103. Triple Canopy Code, supra note 102, § 7.8.
104. Id.
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codes.105 First, Triple Canopy’s code broadens the scope of self-regulation
by applying not only to employees of the company, but also to subcontrac-
tors, vendors, and suppliers.106 In addition, and for the first time in a com-
pany code, a chain of accountability is contemplated. The code notes that
employees are responsible for their own conduct and that supervisors are
responsible and accountable for ensuring that employees comply with the
code.107 Finally, the code breaks new ground in the realm of sanctioning:
“Any reported violation of this Code will be investigated, and every actual
violation will constitute a basis for disciplinary action involving the person
violating this Code up to and including termination, and violations may
result in civil or criminal action against that person.”108 This last sentence is
significant. Previously, the code only contemplated disciplinary action and
the termination of employment. Today, Triple Canopy considers the possi-
bility of civil or criminal action in addition to dismissal from the company
(though it should be noted that most companies contemplate only discipli-
nary action in such cases).109
There is little doubt that company codes of conduct offer a unique
window of understanding on how companies view regulation. The impor-
tance and scope of company codes have increased—partly out of the reali-
zation that enforcement can no longer remain a purely internal matter.
Beyond their impact on companies’ modus operandi, and much like indus-
try codes, company codes have also been used as a springboard to engage
in broader regulatory efforts. Companies have taken a role in promoting
self-regulation and ensuring the harmonization of industry standards—not
just for their own sake but for the benefit of the industry as a whole.
Triple Canopy, for example, has been actively engaged in multi-stake-
holder initiatives. The company actively participated in the drafting of the
ICoC, including by communicating its own code of conduct to the Swiss
government as a source document. At the ICoC signing ceremony, Triple
Canopy’s CEO stressed the importance of subjecting all security compa-
nies worldwide to high ethical and operational standards. Triple Canopy
not only endorsed the ICoC but also committed to ensuring that it “gains
worldwide acceptance and becomes an integral part of how the industry
operates and how governments and clients select security providers” and
that “transparency, oversight, and accountability accompany the Code so
that the full extent of its intent is shown.”110 The company’s commitment
105. See Richemond-Barak, supra note 21, at 1065–66, for a study of the previous ver-
sion of Triple Canopy’s Code.
106. Id. Intro., § 5.1.
107. Id. Pt. 2.0, § 2.5. Id. Pt. 2.0, § 2.5. (emphasis added).
108. See id.
109. See, e.g., ACADEMI, CODE OF BUSINESS ETHICS AND CONDUCT 10 (rev. 2013),
available at https://academi.s3.amazonaws.com/uploads/document/document/29/Academi_
CodeofConduct_03.01.2013.pdf.
110. Triple Canopy, Triple Canopy Signs International Code of Conduct for Private Se-
curity Service Providers, (Nov. 9, 2010) http://www.triplecanopy.com/news/press/triple-
canopy-signs-international-code-of-conduct-for-private-security-serv/.
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to industry self-regulation expressed in the course of the ICoC’s adoption
and in its wake deserves to be noted.
Though it is still too early to speak of an industry pattern, such com-
mitments to internalization and harmonization may reveal a change in
how companies view regulation. They also illustrate the impact that an
inclusive regulatory process can have on the success and implementation
of regulatory initiatives, even in the sacrosanct realm of war and security.
Involving all security industry players had a tangible impact in terms of
legitimacy and internalization—so much so that the industry could provide
an example of how the transnational legal process (or something akin to
it) may be transposed to non-state actors. But before we can apply regula-
tory lessons to actors in other industries, we must first assess the norma-
tive outcome of self-regulation in the private security and military
industry.111
II. ASSESSING THE NORMATIVE OUTCOME OF SELF-REGULATION
IN THE INDUSTRY
Self-regulation in the private security and military industry is dynamic
and innovative, and it takes many forms. But does it work? This Section
examines the normative outcome produced by emerging self-regulatory in-
itiatives, based on benchmarks developed by global administrative law.
The analysis shows the positive impact of self-regulation on participation
and transparency in the industry—a development rarely acknowledged in
the literature. The normative assessment also points to specific weaknesses
of emerging self-regulatory schemes, including, notably, doubts over the
efficacy of sanctions and limitations in terms of individual accountability.
These findings have significant implications well beyond the private
security and military industry.
A. Goal Identification
Because normative assessments of the emerging self-regulatory frame-
work have not been conducted, a few preliminary questions arise. These
questions relate to the very nature of self-regulation and the challenges of
measuring the impact of non-traditional modes of governance.
By nature, traditional and non-traditional modes of governance seek
to achieve similar goals—namely, influencing their addressees’ behavior.
International legal theory measures the role and importance of interna-
tional law by analyzing its influence on state behavior and decision mak-
ing.112 In particular, scholars have sought to assess the relative weight of
international law among other factors influencing state behavior. As schol-
111. See generally Harold Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181, 181
(1996) (defining transnational legal process).
112. See David Dyzenhaus, Accountability and the Concept of (Global) Administrative
Law 20 (Global Administrative Law Series, Working Paper No. 2008/7) (describing the paral-
lel between GAL and general international law at the level of theory); see also ROSALYN
HIGGINS, INTERNATIONAL LAW: PROBLEMS & PROCESS 267 (1994)(describing the role of in-
ternational law in decision-making processes).
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ars measure the effectiveness of international law by its impact on state
behavior,113 so too shall we measure the effectiveness of self-regulatory
schemes based on their impact on their addressees’ behavior.
Because of its non-binding and voluntary nature, self-regulation is
often perceived as weak, self-serving, and ineffective.114 That it typically
only exists as a complement to national or international regulation does
not help. In addition, critics point to the fact that self-regulation leads to
opportunistic behavior on the part of companies that, with no fear of sanc-
tion, may use the appearance of standards and accountability to disguise
poor performance and human rights violations.115
Nevertheless, as the experience of the financial, communications,
transportation, and private military and security sectors (among others)
demonstrate, “self-regulation (either alone, or more commonly, in con-
junction with other policy instruments) can be a remarkably effective and
efficient means of social control.”116 The impact of self-regulation has
been recognized even in the absence of formal sanctioning.117
Like more formal international legal norms, self-regulation seeks to
create a structure, or normative order, within which regulations’ address-
ees cooperate with each other and act along relatively predictable lines. At
the most basic level, self-regulation aims to create and give expression to
an “industry morality” a set of accepted (even if unwritten or non-binding)
standards of behavior to which industry players aspire. As standards be-
come internalized, self-regulation seeks to enhance predictability and
lessen the potential for illegal or abusive behavior.118 Eventually, self-reg-
113. See, e.g., Andre´ Nollkaemper, On the Effectiveness of International Rules in ACTA
POLITICA 49 (1992) (noting that the effectiveness of law indicates the extent to which state
behavior conforms to it). It should add that the very meaning of “effectiveness” is unclear
even in the context of governmental regulation. See Gupta & Lad, supra note 16, at 419.
114. See Gunningham & Rees, supra note 15, at 370.
115. Andrew A. King & Michael J. Lenox, Industry Self-regulation without Sanctions:
The Chemical Industry’s Responsible Care Program, 43 ACAD. MAGMT. J. 698 (2008).
116. Gunningham & Rees, supra note 15, at 363, 405 (arguing that “[w]e must take
seriously the potential for self-regulation in industrial life.”); see also Michael S. Barr &
Geoffrey P. Miller, Global Administrative Law: The View from Basel, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 15
(2006); Paul DiMaggio & Walter Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism
and Collective Rationality in Organization Fields, 48 AM. SOCIOLOGICAL REV. 147, 150
(1983)(“Organizations compete not just for resources and customers, but for political power
and institutional legitimacy, for social as well as economic fitness”); Errol Meidinger, The
Administrative Law of Global Private-Public Regulation: The Case of Forestry, 17 EUR. J.
INT’L L. 47 (2006).
117. See, e.g., Asif Efrat, Designing International Agreements: Evidence from the Inter-
national Regulation of Small Arms, Paper Presented at the Annual Convention of the Inter-
national Studies Association (April 2012); see also Chris Brummer, Why Soft Law Dominates
International Finance—and Not Trade, 13 J. INT’L ECON. L. 623 (2010). Even looking at in-
ternational law more generally, sanctions play only a limited role in ensuring state compli-
ance. See LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE 49 (Columbia University Press, 1979); see
also Higgins, supra note 112, at 16.
118. Gunningham & Rees, supra note 15, at 363 (“bring the behavior of industry mem-
bers within a normative ordering responsive to broader social values.”); see De Nevers, supra
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ulation also ought to provide a framework through which non-compliant
actors may be punished.
Remarkably, self-regulation presents the unique advantage, compared
to more traditional modes of governance, of being able to influence both
states’ and non-state actors’ behavior. The assessment conducted below
shows how self-regulation in the private security and military industry
helped create a framework for inculcating, shaping, monitoring, and even-
tually enforcing behavioral norms among public and private actors alike.
Whether it governs the conduct of states or non-state actors, self-regu-
lation is expected to achieve these goals faster than more formal regula-
tion, while being more sensitive to market circumstances.119 But overall,
what we expect of self-regulation is not that different from what we expect
of traditional and more formal modes of governance.
B. Benchmark Identification
Though the goals of self-regulation have been clarified, the challenge
remains of determining whether these goals have been achieved.
Benchmarks are necessary to assess whether existing self-regulatory
schemes governing the outsourcing of security and military services suc-
ceed in achieving their basic objectives.
Because self-regulation seeks to positively influence its addressees’
behavior, it might seem appropriate to conduct an empirical study of viola-
tions that occurred both before and after the adoption of self-regulatory
schemes. This empirical exercise, however, would only produce a partial
picture of how self-regulatory schemes have affected compliance. Impor-
tant questions would remain unanswered: Is there indeed a causal rela-
tionship between the self-regulatory initiatives and changes in behavior, or
is something else at play—shifting public values, “outing” of rogue behav-
ior, a decline in high-risk contracts, or better training? How soon after the
adoption of a regulatory scheme does compliance improve, and why?
Measuring the occurrence of violations empirically also fails to acknowl-
edge that the issue is not only quantitative—how many violations have
occurred—but also, and importantly, qualitative: what types of violations
have occurred and how such violations have been handled.
Global administrative law (GAL)—the school of thought developed
primarily by New York University scholars for analyzing global govern-
ance—offers valuable guidance on how to assess the impact of non-tradi-
tional regulatory schemes. GAL, as it is commonly known, “begins from
the twin ideas that much of global governance can be understood as ad-
ministration, and that such administration is often organized and shaped
by principles of an administrative character.”120 Building on this observa-
note 19, at 223 (noting that self-regulation aims at changing corporate behavior and as-
suaging public concerns).
119. Gunningham & Rees, supra note 15, at 366.
120. Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch, Richard Stewart and Jonathan Wiener, Fore-
word: Global Governance as Administration—National and Transnational Approaches to
Global Administrative Law, 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 2 (2005).
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tion, GAL applies tools developed in domestic administrative law to assess
the achievements and failures of global governance. More specifically,
GAL analyzes how “administrative law, or mechanisms, rules, and proce-
dures comparable to administrative law, are used to promote trans-
parency, participation, and accountability in informal, cooperative and
hybrid structures and in multi-level systems with shared responsibility in
decision making.”121
Global administrative law thus regards transparency, participation,
and accountability as the components of a successful global administration
scheme. Let us examine whether emerging regulatory frameworks in the
private security and military industry meet these GAL-developed
standards.122
1. Transparency
In less than a decade, transparency in the industry has improved sig-
nificantly. As late as 2005, almost no information was available on the
private security and military industry. Researching contracting firms, con-
tracts, or industry practices posed great challenges. Today, in contrast,
nearly all companies have Internet sites providing information about their
activities, making reference to some of their clients and areas of opera-
tion.123 Though secrecy still prevails at times to protect national security,
private security and military companies have generally become more
transparent by making their “behavior and motives readily knowable to
interested parties.”124 Companies have also become more open about the
extent of their commitment to industry regulation. Many of them highlight
their membership in industry associations and publicly declare (on web-
sites or in marketing materials) their commitment to industry best prac-
tices and self-regulatory schemes.125 These commitments deserve to be
noted notwithstanding the fact that they may not always translate into bet-
ter compliance with the law.
Growing public awareness of the presence and role of contractors on
the battlefield, too, has played a role in enhancing transparency. In the
121. Kingsbury et al., supra note 9, at 61 (emphasis added).
122. These GAL-developed benchmarks enable a systematic and critical analysis of reg-
ulatory developments in the industry. I should note that GAL encourages the use of stan-
dardized benchmarks in order to enable “cross-fertilization.” Only if various global
governance schemes are assessed using set criteria can the schemes effectively be compared
to one another and can insights be learned for other industries. This Article thus conducts the
first GAL-type analysis of the normative outcome produced by emerging self-regulatory
schemes in the private security and military industry.
123. See, e.g., http://www.hartinternational.com/; http://www.g4s.com/en/.
124. Thomas N. Hale, Transparency, Accountability, and Global Governance, 14
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 73, 75 (2008).
125. See Richemond-Barak, supra note 21, at 1062; see also Kal Raustiala, Compliance
and Effectiveness in International Regulatory Cooperation, 32 CASE W. J. INT’L L. 387, 425
(2000).
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wake of the events in Falluja and Abu Ghraib in 2004,126 the industry
received much attention from the media, government officials, and the
public at large. Documentaries, most of them critical of the industry, were
produced and widely screened.127 The press began reporting extensively
on the industry, especially on abuses committed by private military con-
tractors in Iraq and Afghanistan. Steve Fainaru of the Washington Post
spent an entire year reporting on private military contractors, for exam-
ple.128 Individual contractors—and not just the companies that hire
them—face increased scrutiny from the firms that employ them, the pub-
lic, the media, and international actors. As a result, the industry was com-
pelled to make its practices more public and clarify the extent and nature
of its role.
Transparency concerns show at the institutional level, as well. For ex-
ample, the main industry association posted on its website a detailed ex-
planation of the process leading to the revision of its code of conduct.129
At the multi-stakeholder level, the ICoC Steering Committee published all
minutes of its working groups’ meetings and called on the wider public to
comment on the Draft Charter of the Oversight Mechanism for the Interna-
tional Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers.130 The
United Nations, through more formal channels, also places increased em-
phasis on transparency, openly hiring private security contractors and de-
veloping policies to govern their employment.131 Its Working Group on
Mercenaries (the “U.N. Working Group”) has gained and shared greater
knowledge of the industry’s modus operandi by way of reports, country
visits, and establishment of complaint procedures.132 Even the U.N. Draft
Convention on Private Security and Military Companies declares that it is
“aimed at ensuring that States take the necessary measures to promote
126. See Jeffrey Gettleman, Enraged Mod in Falluja Kills 4 American Contractors, N.Y.
TIMES (31 March 2004); and Seymour Hersh, Torture at Abu Ghraib, THE NEW YORKER (10
May 2004).
127. IRAQ FOR SALE (Brave New Films 2006) (directed by Robert Greenwald), and
SHADOW COMPANY (Purpose Built Film, 2006) (directed by Nic Bicanic and Jason Bourque)
are two examples.
128. Fainaru also published a widely acclaimed book on the topic. See Steve Fainaru,
BIG BOY RULES: AMERICA’S MERCENARIES FIGHTING IN IRAQ (Da Capo, 2008)).
129. See ISOA Code of Conduct, supra note 11.
130. See Richard Stewart, Accountability, Participation, and the Problem of Disregard in
Global Regulatory Governance 33 (2008), available at http://iilj.org/courses/documents/
2008Colloquium.Session4.Stewart.pdf (“[T]he provision of information is a necessary but not
sufficient condition for accountability.”).
131. See Kristen Boon, New Guidelines for Armed Private Security Companies Doing
Business with the U.N., OPINIO JURIS (2012).
132. See Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries as a Means of Violating Human
Rights and Impeding the Exercise of the Right of People to Self-Determination, U.N. OFF. OF
THE HIGH COMMISSIONER OF HUM. RTS. (Mar. 20, 2014), http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/
Mercenaries/WGMercenaries/Pages/WGMercenariesIndex.aspx.
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transparency, responsibility, and accountability in their use of PMSCs and
their personnel.”133
Skeptics would argue that this evolution toward transparency has
more to do with a quest for legitimacy (that is, greater business opportu-
nity) than with a true concern for transparency. Certainly, the quest for
legitimacy has played a role—but it has by no means been the only moti-
vation.134 A number of factors have contributed to enhanced transparency
in the industry:135 public opinion in the wake of contractor abuses; media
attention to the growing role of private actors on the battlefield; govern-
mental debate on the efficacy and cost of outsourcing security and military
functions to for-profit institutions; adoption of industry-wide standards
and practices by industry associations; and disclosure programs initiated
by companies acting in response to the foregoing developments or to the
directives of their boards of directors.136 Peer pressure did the rest: when a
cluster of companies within the industry decided to make their work, cli-
ents, vetting methods, enforcement schemes, and contracts public, it cre-
ated incentives for other companies to do the same.137 So while the quest
for legitimacy did play a role in enhancing transparency in the industry,
the changes witnessed cannot be reduced to this factor alone.
Any criticism, to be credible, must acknowledge the industry’s sub-
stantial progress in the realm of transparency. Instead of a sweeping criti-
cism of emerging regulatory schemes—which are, without doubt, far from
perfect—this Article suggests to focus on what can be done to make self-
regulation work.
The industry must find a way to better publicize instances of violations
as a first and indispensable step toward greater transparency.138 At the
moment, no public data exists regarding violations by corporations or indi-
vidual contractors of internal company regulations, industry standards, do-
mestic law, or international law (assuming that companies and institutions
do keep a record of violations). In addition, companies must provide more
133. See U.N. Human Rights Council, Rep. of the Working Group on the Use of Merce-
naries as a Means of Violating Human Rights and Impeding the Exercise of the Right of Peo-
ples to Self-Determination, Annex, ¶ 41, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/15/25 (July 2, 2010) (by Jose Luis
Gomez del Prado) [hereinafter “U.N. Draft Convention”] (the Annex contains the Draft of a
Possible Convention on Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) for Consideration
and Action by the Human Rights Council).
134. See Richemond-Barak, supra note 21.
135. The relationship between transparency and accountability in global governance
has been examined in Hale, supra note 124.
136. See supra note 96; supra Part I.B; Sam Black & Anjali Kamat, After 12 Years of
War, Labor Abuses Rampant on U.S. Bases in Afghanistan, AL JAZEERA (March 7, 2014),
http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/3/7/after-12-years-ofwarlaborabusesrampantonus
basesinafghanistan.html. See generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, www.gao.gov
(last visited Nov. 6, 2014).
137. See Hale, supra note 124, at 76 (arguing that, as a result of market pressure, inter-
nal norms, and discourse between industry players, the information disclosed by companies
actually influences other companies’ behavior in a positive way).
138. I am indebted to Professor Laura Dickinson for this important point.
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information on the role and substance of internal complaint mechanisms.
Companies must also encourage employees to use internal complaint
mechanisms not only to address employment issues and other administra-
tive matters, but also to raise instances of violations of industry standards
and applicable law. When companies modify internal compliance schemes,
they should issue press releases explaining the motivations behind such
changes. Too many companies have withdrawn or replaced codes of con-
duct without explanation. In some cases the codes are resurrected in re-
vised versions that are later publicized on companies’ websites.139 In
others, they simply disappear. More work can and must be done to ensure
transparency on regulatory matters, but significant progress has been
made over the past decade, by any measure.
2. Participation
Similar progress has been made in the realm of participation. Within
the past decade, private military companies have become active partici-
pants in formal and informal regulatory initiatives. They attend interna-
tional conferences promoting regulation, take part in multi-stakeholder
initiatives, and engage in dialogue with states on matters of concern. In-
dustry associations participated in the discussions leading up to the adop-
tion of the Montreux Document in 2007 and made submissions to the
South African Parliament during the drafting of its legislation on private
security and military companies.140 Membership in industry associations
confirms this trend: from only eight members in 2005, the main industry
association (the International Stability Operations Association) now has
more than forty members.141 And, as noted above, more than 700 compa-
nies have signed on to the ICoC.142 Companies, civil society organizations,
and governments participated on equal footing in the ICoC’s steering
committee and working groups, and in the yet-to-be-established ICoC or-
gans.143 This amounts to decisional participation, with all stakeholders
having a genuine impact on the decision-making process. The ICoC Char-
ter, for example, was adopted following an extensive consultation among
stakeholders and the public at large.144 And the U.N. Draft Convention is
the product of “a series of consultation with a wide range of stakehold-
ers”—suggesting that even traditional forms of regulation in the industry
have become more participatory.145
139. See Richemond-Barak, supra note 21, at 1065–66.
140. See supra Part I.B.
141. My sense is that membership has similarly increased in other associations, but un-
fortunately data is not publicly available.
142. See ICOC, ICoC Signatory Companies, http://www.icoc-psp.org/ICoCSignatory
Companies.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2014).
143. See ICOC, ICoC Temporary Steering Committee, http://www.icoc-psp.org/
ICoC_Steering_Committee.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2014); see alsoICoC, ICoC Working
Groups, http://www.icoc-psp.org/ICoC_Working_Groups.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2014).
144. See ICOC, http://www.icoc-psp.org (last visited Nov. 6, 2014).
145. See U.N. Draft Convention, supra note 133, ¶ 58.
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Increased participation of the industry in regulatory initiatives, no
matter how welcomed and desirable, should not be used by the industry as
a way to lower applicable legal standards and obligations. The value of
participation depends on the nature of such participation. Unfortunately,
too little is known about the nature of the industry’s contribution to instru-
ments like the Montreux Document or the ICoC. Did industry players ad-
vocate less stringent standards and procedures? What views did they hold
on the sanctioning of non-compliant actors? Ultimately, did their presence
at the table strengthen or weaken the regulatory outcome? In addition,
more information is needed on the impact of participation. For companies
that had set high standards at the outset, participation could potentially
mean doing less, not more. Consider, for example, the case of Erinys.
Erinys had one of the most comprehensive and sophisticated schemes in
the industry. In the wake of the ICoC’s adoption, Erinys dismantled the
scheme and replaced it with a reference to the ICoC. Unlike Erinys’ origi-
nal scheme, the ICoC does not contemplate a two-pronged monitoring
system—raising the question of the impact of participation for companies
with stringent internal regulation.146
In other words, though participation has increased significantly over
the past decade, more data is needed to assess the value and impact of
participation in the industry. One way to give participation further mean-
ing would be to treat participation as a precondition to doing business.
Governments, the United Nations, and other entities hiring private secur-
ity companies should work only with companies that are members in good
standing of industry associations (such as the United States based ISOA)
or self-regulatory schemes (such as the ICoC). For this purpose, hiring en-
tities could rely on the certification scheme developed under the Charter.
Though not finalized yet, the scheme will provide a valuable, hopefully
public, and up-to-date resource available to those wanting to contract out
security or military services.147 Insisting on mandatory participation in the
ICoC and certification under the terms of the Charter could have a signifi-
cant impact on compliance—even in the absence of bureaucratic oversight
or the incorporation of industry standards into domestic laws and enforce-
ment regimes.
3. Accountability
Given the intimate relationships among transparency, participation,
and accountability, progress made in the first two has led to greater ac-
countability. There is little doubt that the multiplication and sophistication
of self-regulatory schemes, combined with public scrutiny and peer pres-
sure, have played a role. Knowing more about the industry has also al-
lowed for better and more targeted oversight. But transparency and
146. See supra p.20.
147. See Draft Charter, supra note 11, art. 11.
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participation alone cannot promote accountability.148 Mechanisms de-
signed to monitor compliance with existing standards and to sanction non-
compliant actors must be created to enhance accountability.
The challenge begins with the difficulty of delineating the contours of
the concept of accountability in the realm of global governance. Can there
be accountability, and, if so, what form may such accountability take? The
industry has developed some level of “soft” accountability—primarily in
the form of market pressure and “naming and shaming.” This type of ac-
countability featured prominently in early drafts of the ICoC Charter,
which placed an emphasis on publicizing disciplinary actions.149 Perform-
ance assessments, review processes, and suspension or termination of
membership also had to be publicly announced,150 and the Secretariat was
obligated to maintain a public listing of companies, reflecting their mem-
bership and certification status.151 Unfortunately the Articles of Associa-
tion eliminated this soft form of accountability, though hope remains that
it may be rectified as ICoC oversight mechanisms take shape.
Even if this form of peer pressure were eventually restored, more is
needed for the industry to properly self-regulate. Accountability implies
sanctions. What type of sanctions, if any, can the industry contemplate? Is
“hard” enforcement of the type existing in domestic systems (and to a
much lesser degree in international law) at all possible? Lenox and Nash
advocate the use of sanctions, specifically the expulsion of non-compliant
members from industry associations—a sanction which I believe remains
insufficient.152 As GAL scholars have noted, global governance must
build “meaningful and effective mechanisms of accountability to control
abuses of power and secure rule-of-law values.”153 Expulsion (let alone
suspension) of regulatory schemes do not meet this GAL-developed stan-
dard. Accountability mechanisms in the industry must incorporate tougher
sanctions like the referral of non-compliant actors to national authori-
ties.154 I elaborate further on what these mechanisms should look like in
Part III.
An additional difficulty lies in identifying the subjects of self-regula-
tion.155All existing schemes place an emphasis on corporate accountabil-
148. See Richard Stewart, Accountability, Participation, and the Problem of Disregard in
Global Regulatory Governance (2008), available at http://iilj.org/courses/documents/2008
Colloquium.Session4.Stewart.pdf (“[T]he provision of information is a necessary but not suf-
ficient condition for accountability.”).
149. See Draft Charter, supra note 11.
150. See id.,  §§ C(4), D(4)(c), F(2).
151. See id. § C(1)(d).
152. Michael J. Lenox and Jennifer Nash, Industry Self-Regulation and Adverse Selec-
tion: A Comparison Across Four Trade Association Programs, 12 Bus. Strat. Env. 1, 5 (2003).
153. See Kingsbury et al., supra note 9, at 51.
154. These mechanisms would complement, rather than replace, internal proceedings
against noncompliant employees initiated within the company itself and the suspension or
expulsion of noncompliant members from industry associations.
155. See Nico Krisch, The Pluralism of Global Administrative Law, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L.
247, 249 (2006) (discussing the constituency question).
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ity. As I explain further in Part III, this approach is too restrictive. Self-
regulatory schemes must reach corporations as well as individual contrac-
tors. In addition, the focus on corporate and individual accountability
when shaping self-regulatory schemes should not serve to evade or some-
how excuse state accountability.
Emerging industry schemes also take as axiomatic the hiring of private
security and military companies by states156—overlooking the growing
practice on the part of intergovernmental organizations and multi-national
corporations to turn to outsourcing.157 Accountability mechanisms must
accommodate the increasingly common hiring of private security and mili-
tary companies by international organizations, non-governmental organi-
zations, or multi-national corporations. These situations create
jurisdictional complexities that, taken together, militate in favor of a
global, hybrid regulatory scheme as the only workable framework for ac-
countability. Unfortunately, developing frameworks do not address this in-
creasingly common set of circumstances.
Finally, emerging regulatory schemes must attribute levels of responsi-
bility to the various industry players involved. Many industries are en-
gaged in a vibrant debate over whether top-down or bottom-up
approaches to regulation are best: Should the factory director of a com-
pany in China be responsible for environmental pollution? What about the
directors of a company—should they be criminally responsible for actions
of their employees? How far down along the hierarchical ladder should
regulators go when devising regulatory schemes? As I explain below, poli-
cies should provide adequate incentives for all relevant actors to abide by
agreed-upon standards. While an industry worker in Bangladesh should
not share responsibility for the violation of fire safety procedures, an indi-
vidual contractor deployed in Afghanistan should be held responsible for
intentionally killing civilians. In the context of the private security and mil-
itary industry, in other words, incentives must be created for company per-
sonnel to comply with applicable regulation. The model proposed in Part
IV goes down the hierarchical ladder all the way from the hiring entity,
state or otherwise, to the corporation and the individual in the hope of
creating better incentives for all actors involved.
156. See, e.g., U.N. Draft Convention, supra note 133, art. 7.
157. See, e.g., A˚se Gilje Østensen, U.N. Use of Private Military and Security Companies:
Practices and Policies, GENEVA CTR. FOR THE DEMOCRATIC CONTROL OF ARMED FORCES
(2011), http://www.dcaf.ch/Publications/UN-Use-of-Private-Military-and-Security-Companies
-Practices-and-Policies. See U.N. Dep’t of Safety & Sec., Guidelines on the Use of Armed
Security Services from Private Security Companies (Nov. 8, 2012), http://www.ohchr.org/
Documents/Issues/Mercenaries/WG/StudyPMSC/GuidelinesOnUseOfArmedSecurity
Services.pdf; Christopher Spearin, Humanitarian Non-Governmental Organizations and In-
ternational Private Companies, DCAF (2006); ICRC Guard Killed in Mogadishu Shooting
Accident, HIIRAAN ONLINE (Dec. 13, 2008), http://www.hiiraan.com/news4/2008/Dec/8957/
icrc_guard_killed_in_mogadishu_shooting_incident.aspx; see also Anne-Marie Buzatu &
Benjamin S. Buckland, Private Military & Security Companies: Future Challenges in Security
Governance, DCAF (2010).
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To summarize, the private security and military industry has under-
gone a transformation of its image, practices, and governance over the
past decade. It has gained its legitimacy primarily as a result of working
closely with other relevant stakeholders toward the establishment of a reg-
ulatory framework. The most tangible product of this public and private
cooperation is the set of standards developed, promoted, and internalized
by private security and military companies themselves. While critics have
deplored the very fact of the industry’s efforts at self-regulating, I believe
that self-regulation can work. For it to work, the industry needs to publi-
cize its standards and practices, as well as instances of violations and how
they are dealt with—both internally and in cooperation with law enforce-
ment bodies. In addition, governments, NGOs, international organizations
should insist on clients’ membership in industry associations and adher-
ence to hybrid self-regulatory schemes. More research should be con-
ducted on the industry’s contribution to the development, nature, and
scope of industry standards. Finally, the progress made in standard setting
should translate into efficient monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms to
ensure accountability. Only then will self-regulation fully achieve the de-
sired normative outcome.
III. PROPOSING A NEW REGULATORY MODEL FOR THE INDUSTRY
Critics of the industry’s self-regulatory frameworks have missed the
point. The weakness of the emerging regulatory framework governing war
and security rests neither in its soft nor in its voluntary nature. On the
contrary, in my view both of these characteristics hold distinct advantages
if properly conceptualized. The widespread and voluntary endorsement of
the International Code of Conduct—the standard-setting document which
over 700 companies have signed since its adoption in 2010—suggests that
soft law may have distinct appeal for industry players. Similarly, the or-
ganic development of corporate and industry codes of conduct under the
auspices of the U.S.-based ISOA and the U.K.-based BAPSC, may reflect
the advantages of voluntary initiatives over rigid regulation. So far, indus-
try associations and the companies themselves have played a leading role,
alongside NGOs and interested governments, in helping define the con-
tours of a new regulatory regime. These stakeholders (and this author)
have no illusions about the limitations of the current regulatory frame-
work. But it would be wrong to ignore or minimize as “window dressing”
the progress we have witnessed; and any attempt to introduce a greater
degree of “hard” standards and sanctions must acknowledge and build on
this progress.
In this Section, I propose a model for global governance of the private
security and military industry, taking into account its unique characteris-
tics, transnational nature, industry self-regulatory initiatives, and the
emerging consensus around applicable standards. The model contemplates
the creation of a network of regional monitoring bodies supervised by an
international sanctioning body. Such a structure could address the main
weaknesses of the existing self-regulatory schemes: first, the absence of
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real sanctions against non-compliant actors, and, second, the need to ex-
tend accountability to individuals.
As a starting point, it is important and encouraging to note that the
present “proto-regime” bears some resemblance to other hybrid regula-
tory initiatives which began as voluntary undertakings and multilateral
initiatives.
The financial services sector provides several examples of self-regula-
tory mechanisms overseen or influenced by international standard-setting
bodies, with regional monitoring bodies that include government bureau-
cracies. The experience of the International Accounting Standards Board
(IASB), which develops standards for corporate accounting and financial
reporting, is instructive. Funded by contributions from major accounting
firms, private financial institutions and industrial companies, central and
development banks, national funding regimes, and other international and
professional organizations throughout the world, the IASB publishes the
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS).158 What began as an
initiative aimed at harmonizing European Union (E.U.) accounting prac-
tices developed over three decades to become the authoritative reference
point for accountants internationally—so authoritative, in fact, that E.U.-
listed companies have been required to prepare their financial statements
following these standards since 2005.159 The IASB’s meetings are held in
public and webcast, and new standards are adopted following the publica-
tion of consultative documents on which interested parties may comment.
Approximately 120 nations and reporting jurisdictions permit or require
the use of the standards and ninety countries are in full compliance with
the standards. Viewed from the perspective of global governance, the ac-
counting industry presents a model of success: a multi-stakeholder self-
regulatory scheme that operates with transparency, the broadest of partici-
pation, and accountability enforced by domestic law enforcement bodies.
160
Though its contribution is more debated, the Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision, too, has led to the harmonization of banking super-
vision and operating standards. Today it is the primary global standard
setter for the prudential regulation of banks and provides a forum for co-
operation on banking supervisory matters.161 The informal and horizontal
nature of the process—monitoring takes place through peer review162—
has provided states with an opportunity to exchange experiences and har-
158. See IFRS, International Financial Reporting Standards, http//www.ifrs.com/ifrs_
faqs.html#q2 (last visited Nov. 6, 2014).
159. Regulation (EC) No. 1606/2002, of the European Parliament and of the Council of
19 July 2002 on the Application of International Accounting Standards.
160. See IFRS, International Financial Reporting Standards FAQs, AICPA IFRS RE-
SOURCES (2014), http://www.ifrs.com/ifrs_faqs.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2014).
161. See Bank for International Settlements, About Basel Committee, BANK FOR INT’L
SETTLEMENTS, http://www.bis.org/bcbs/about.htm (last updated Jun. 10, 2013).
162. See About Basel Committee, BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, http://
www.bis.org/bcbs/about.htm (last updated Jun. 10, 2013).
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monize industry standards far from the perceived threat of international
regulation. 163
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) represents a more “formal” global governance scheme that has
encouraged, and in many cases overseen, the promotion of internationally
accepted standards of conduct.164 The organization’s structure, and the
mechanisms through which it addresses regulatory directives to national
governments and industry, hold potential for the private security and mili-
tary industry.165 After consideration of an array of global governance
schemes, 166 I believe the OECD offers some of the best guidance for a
hybrid, multi-level regulatory structure for the private security and mili-
tary industry: one which combines monitoring at the local or national level
with supervision and sanctioning at the international or intergovernmental
level. Alongside these monitoring, supervisory, or standard-setting func-
tions, I propose the introduction of a sanctioning mechanism that builds
on the strength of local law enforcement but vests primary sanctioning
authority at the international level. While I do not advocate the establish-
ment of a regulatory regime for private military companies within the
163. See Michael S. Barr & Geoffrey P. Miller, Global Administrative Law: The View
from Basel, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 5 (2006).
164. See About the OECD, http://www.oecd.org/about/ (last visited Nov. 6, 2014).
165. See id.
166. See, e.g., Agreement Relating to Trade in Cotton, Wool, Man-made Fiber, Non-
Cotton Vegetable Fiber and Silk Blend Textiles and Textile Products Between the Govern-
ment of the United States of America and the Royal Government of Cambodia, U.S.-Cam-
bodia, Jan. 20, 1999, available at http://cambodia.usembassy.gov/uploads/images/M9rzdrz
MKGi6Ajf0SIuJRA/uskh_texttile.pdf (giving the International Labor Organization a role in
monitoring compliance with the agreement); International Labour Organization [ILO], ILO
Constitution, Art. 26–29 (1919) http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:62:0::NO:62:
P62_LIST_ENTRIE_ID:2453907:NO. (allowing its members to file complaints with the In-
ternational Labor Office alleging violations on the part of other members of the organiza-
tion); Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S.
299 (compliance with the latter is monitored—though not sanctioned—by the SIRS Council,
which comprises all WTO members and is responsible for conducting peer reviews of mem-
bers’ compliance with their obligations under the TRIPS agreement); KIMBERLEY PROCESS,
http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/ (last visited Nov. 6, 2014) (containing a certification
scheme as well as a mechanism hearing complaints from project-affected communities but
does not have competence to impose solutions or to inflict sanctions (How We Work:
Ombudsman, OFFICE OF THE COMPLIANCE ADVISOR / OMBUDSMAN, http://www.cao-
ombudsman.org/howwework/ombudsman/index.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2014); About Us,
THE WORLD BANK INSPECTION PANEL, http://ewebapps.worldbank.org/apps/ip/Pages/
AboutUS.aspx (last visited Nov. 6, 2014) (operating as a body with the authority to deter-
mine if any of the World Bank’s operational policies or procedures has been violated by the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development or the International Development
Association); and see the Commission on Environmental Cooperation http://www.cec.org/
Page.asp?PageID=751&SiteNodeID=250 (an intergovernmental organization created by the
environmental side agreement to the NAFTA, which is authorized to review complaints sub-
mitted by any resident of North America regarding NAFTA parties’ compliance with domes-
tic environmental laws).
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framework of the OECD or its organs, the organization’s structure has
much informed the model I propose below.
Initially established by Western leaders in the wake of World War II to
encourage reconstruction, economic development, and cooperation in Eu-
rope, the OECD today comprises thirty-four member states.167 These
states include the United States and Canada, alongside advanced emerging
markets such as Turkey, Chile, Israel, and Korea. The OECD also main-
tains official and consultative relations with international organizations
(for example, the International Labor Organization, the International
Monetary Fund, the World Bank), civil society groups (NGOs, think
tanks, academia), and significant non-member states (Brazil, China, Rus-
sia and others). It provides a forum in which these countries and stake-
holders can agree on common standards and coordinate policies in areas
such as agriculture, competition, governance, anti-bribery, education, envi-
ronmental, finance, health, industry, tax, and other matters. As the pre-
mier intergovernmental organization of its kind— and a long-established
forum for coordinating global policy initiatives—the OECD’s record of
fostering cooperation among industry and government deserves close ex-
amination. 168
For our purposes, I would like to focus on one specific OECD initia-
tive: the elaboration of the Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (the
“Guidelines”).169 The Guidelines consist of a detailed set of principles and
standards of conduct, adopted by OECD member states, that are applica-
ble to multinational enterprises operating in and from OECD countries.170
Addressed by governments to the private sector, the Guidelines are non-
binding. Compliance takes place on a voluntary basis, though the countries
adhering to the Guidelines make a binding commitment to implement
them domestically. 171 In fact, the Guidelines represent the first and per-
haps most comprehensive multilateral code of responsible business con-
duct that governments have committed to promoting.172 They cover areas
as broad as employment and industrial relations, human rights, environ-
167. See History of the OECD, http://www.oecd.org/about/history/ (last visited Nov. 6,
2014).
168. Id. The Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), predecessor
to the OECD, was originally established in 1948 to administer the Marshall Plan. The organi-
zation later reorganized and updated its mission, and was re-launched as the OECD in 1961
with membership open to non-European states.
169. See Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, OECD Guide-
lines for Multinational Enterprises, (2011), http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/mne/48004323.pdf
[hereinafter 2011 OECD Guidelines] (showing the fifth time the Guidelines are amended.
The previous amendments took place in 1979, 1984, 1991 and 2011).
170. See id. at 3.
171. See id. at 13.
172. The Guidelines were first adopted in 1976. By way of comparison, the U.N. Global
Compact, which seeks to align the practices of corporate and public actors in areas of human
rights, labor, environment and corruption, only came about in 2000. See Overview of the
U.N. Global Compact, http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/index.html (last vis-
ited Nov. 6, 2014).
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ment, information disclosure, combating bribery, consumer interests, sci-
ence and technology, competition, and taxation.173
In order to monitor compliance with the Guidelines, the OECD relies
on multi-level cooperation and employs a decentralized, soft, mediation-
based implementation mechanism.174 It includes dual levels of control:
first, at the domestic level with non-judicial monitoring bodies called Na-
tional Contact Points (NCPs) located in each individual member state;
and, second, at the international level with a supervisory body (the OECD
Investment Committee).
An NCP consists of “a government office responsible for encouraging
observance of [the Guidelines] in a national context and for ensuring that
the Guidelines are well known and understood by the national business
community and by other interested parties.”175 Its role is to promote re-
spect for the Guidelines, deal with inquiries, and assist in solving problems
arising out of the Guidelines’ implementation. All OECD members must
establish a NCP on their territories—but they have flexibility in terms of
organization.176 As monitoring bodies, NCPs also serve as the initial stage
of consideration for issues and conflicts arising under the Guidelines.177
Any person or organization may submit a complaint to an NCP, and the
NCP may help resolve the dispute by offering services or consulting with
third parties. At the end of the process, the NCP may make a public state-
ment or report describing the issues raised, as well as whether an agree-
ment has been reached, and why.178 As such, NCPs play a role both as a
forum for discussion and as a light mechanism for dispute settlement.179
At the international level, the OECD Investment Committee fulfills
coordination, facilitation, and soft-supervisory functions. But it exercises
only limited oversight: it has no power to overrule a decision made at the
local NCP level, nor can it act as a judicial or quasi-judicial body, or reach
173. See 2011 OECD Guidelines, supra note 169, Foreword, ¶ 1, Pt. I.
174. See Gefion Schuler, Effective Governance through Decentralized Soft Implementa-
tion: The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, 9 GERMAN L.J. 1753, 1755 (2008).
175. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, OECD Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises: Frequently Asked Questions, Guidelines for Multinational Enter-
prises, available at  http://www.oecd.org/fr/daf/inv/mne/theoecdguidelinesformultination-
alenterprisesfrequentlyaskedquestions.htm. See also Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development, OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, available at
http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/mne/48004323.pdf [hereinafter Guidelines].
176. See id. at 7; see also., http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/mne/NCPContactDetails.pdf pdf
(explaining in Germany, the Ministry of Economics and Technology serves as the National
Contact Point. In Canada and Japan, divisions of the countries’ respective foreign ministries
act as the National Contact Point. In Denmark, Finland and Ireland, ministries of employ-
ment serve as National Contact Points).
177. See James Salzman, Decentralized Administrative Law in the Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development, 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 189, 213 (2005) [hereinafter
Salzman].
178. See id. at 71–74.
179. See id. at 79.
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conclusions on the conduct of individual enterprises.180 Instead, it must
consult with the relevant NCPs before making recommendations to im-
prove the functioning of NCPs and the effective implementation of the
Guidelines.181 The non-binding character of its recommendations,182 and
the impossibility to issue determinations to the effect that the Guidelines
have been violated, constitute serious limitations in the realm of sanction-
ing.183 Though important, the role of the international body is limited in
comparison to the role of the local NCPs.184
A. A Model for Effective, Multi-Level Regulation of the Industry
Over the past decade, the private security and military industry—
working together with civil society organizations and governments—has
introduced a strong measure of self-governance and hybrid governance
into an area that was once plagued by legal uncertainty and a virtual vac-
uum of transparency and participation.185 It has done so by dramatically
elevating the role of multi-stakeholder initiatives designed to set standards
of good conduct: the widely subscribed ICoC serves as the best current
example of what has been accomplished.
The logical next step in the evolution of regulation of the industry,
however, is to introduce systematic monitoring and sanctions. This can be
accomplished while preserving key elements of the present proto-govern-
ance scheme. But it will require the introduction of more formal processes
and authorities, much as the OECD provides a formal (albeit weak) gov-
ernance structure to support self-regulation and national law making in
select areas of economic activity. The U.N. Working Group on Merce-
naries—possibly reconstituted under a new title referring expressly to pri-
vate military contractors—would be a natural candidate to oversee the
establishment of the new regulatory regime, though other possible super-
visory bodies are noted below.
The model I propose here builds on the success of governments, non-
governmental organizations and contracting firms themselves in establish-
ing and legitimizing baseline behavioral norms and codes of conduct,
which culminated in the recent Charter of the Oversight Mechanism.186 It
is informed by the experience of other self-regulatory initiatives, such as
180. See id. at 88.
181. See id. at 73; see also Procedural Guidance, supra note 176, § II (C); see also Ri-
anne Mahon & Stephen Mc Bride, Standardizing and Disseminating Knowledge: The Role of
the OECD in Global Governance, 1 EUR. POL. SCI. REV. 83, 90 (2009) (“The OECD’s main
contribution to transnational governance may, however, be its ‘meditative’ function.”).
182. See Salzman, supra note 177, at 213–14.
183. See Jernej Letnar Cernic, Corporate Responsibility for Human Rights: A Critical
Analysis of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, 4 HANSE L. REV. 71, 94–96
(2008).
184. See Schuler, supra note 174, at 1765, 1777 (noting that the shift to a decentralized
system was made as part of the 2000 revision of the Guidelines).
185. See supra Part II.B.
186. See supra note 11.
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the IASB-developed standards, which began as an effort to harmonize
regulation, but with time became the de facto “language” of the financial
industry. And it borrows from the OECD’s Guidelines that, while weak on
enforcement, is still one of the only examples of a multilateral code of
business conduct that contemplates multi-level monitoring and has been
subscribed to by a large number of statess.
The proposed model breaks from other initiatives in several meaning-
ful ways, however. First and foremost, and as noted above, the proposed
model contemplates the imposition of sanctions beyond the mere exclu-
sion or suspension of non-compliant actors. Existing self-regulatory
schemes in the private security and military industry contemplate dismissal
as the main, if not only, sanction for non-compliance, leaving a true ac-
countability deficit.187 The threat of suspension or exclusion from an in-
dustry association—even if it means a company cannot bid on contracts, as
some have proposed—is an insufficient sanction where significant wrong-
doing has taken place.
Second, the model provides for two layers of accountability. Current
practices and proposals address only corporate accountability, which is in-
sufficient to ensure respect for industry standards.188 Only individual ac-
countability can provide incentives for the employees of private security
companies to conform to the applicable standards. By contemplating the
imposition of sanctions against companies and contractors alike, the pro-
posed model would significantly broaden the reach (and thus the poten-
tial) of self-regulation in the industry.189
Third, the proposed model mandates transparency and participation,
by requiring all private security and military companies with international
activities to “join” the regulatory scheme via relevant local jurisdictions
and by insisting on their good standing as a precondition to contracting
their services.
Finally, the model envisages the roles of monitoring and sanctioning
as independent of each other. This point may seem obvious—but the ten-
dency has been to refer to monitoring and sanctioning under the general
heading “enforcement mechanisms,” with the unfortunate consequence
that sanctioning is often overlooked.190 Monitoring and sanctioning need
not necessarily be performed by separate bodies—but they are concep-
tually distinct and require different capabilities. Consider, for example, the
monitoring functions currently performed by industry associations. Indus-
try associations are well placed to monitor their members, given their inti-
mate understanding of the industry, close contacts with contracting firms,
187. See supra note 11.
188. See generally, Voluntary Principles, supra note 20; Draft Charter, supra note 11.
189. I should add, with a note of caution, that the sidelining of the state at the regula-
tory level should be carefully weighed to ensure that state accountability is not being side-
lined by the growing accountability of private actors.
190. See Voluntary Principles, supra note 20 (embodying a rare example of a scheme
contemplating both monitoring and sanctioning at the company level and at the governmen-
tal level, following referral to appropriate authorities).
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and sensitivity to contractor behavior that might attract adverse public at-
tention. But they are ill equipped to sanction private security and military
companies—let alone to address criminal abuses committed by individual
contractors. In contrast, government organs and judicial authorities are
best equipped to address sanctioning, but are not necessarily capable of
monitoring individual companies. The proposed model addresses this con-
cern by splitting monitoring from sanctioning. It advocates in favor of a
two-level mechanism combining the use of domestic, non-governmental
mechanisms at the monitoring stage with the use of both domestic and
international bodies at the sanctioning phase.
B. Monitoring in the Proposed Model
Building on the experience of the OECD, direct monitoring of the
industry would be carried out by locally established monitoring offices
(LMOs)—bodies created specifically for this purpose, either in individual
states or at the regional level. Though local governmental offices often
serve as NCPs in the OECD framework,191 in the case of the security sec-
tor LMOs would be independent from national governments. As the gov-
ernment is generally a major client of private security and military
companies, this would help mitigate potential conflicts of interest. I disa-
gree with the possibility once raised in the UK of having a public monitor-
ing body.192 LMOs would, however, be governed by boards with industry,
governmental, and non-governmental representation. An obvious candi-
date for a U.S. or North American LMO, for example, would be a new,
independent executive body overseen by a board with representatives
from the U.S. Department of State, the U.S. Department of Defense, the
ISOA, the ICRC, and leading think tanks and NGOs. A strengthened and
restructured ISOA could also work.
LMOs would have broad monitoring responsibility for internationally
active private security and military companies registered or operating
within their jurisdictions. The scope of this monitoring function could bor-
row from the Charter, which contemplates the ongoing and independent
monitoring of companies’ activities (though it did not specify who might
act as a monitor),193 as well as targeted performance reviews when a seri-
ous violation occurred or was likely to occur.194 Taking the monitoring
function further than the Charter contemplated, the LMO under the pro-
posed model would also verify that companies implement their own codes
of conduct and those of industry associations in which they are members;
‘certify’ that companies meet basic compliance standards as a prerequisite
191. See Salzman, supra note 177, at 213–215. See also supra note 176.
192. See FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, PRIVATE MILITARY AND SECURITY
COMPANIES (PMSCS): SUMMARY OF PUBLIC CONSULTATION WORKING GROUP, 2010 (U.K.),
available at http://www.fco.gov.uk/resources/en/pdf/about-us/our-publications/pmsc-working-
group-summary-060410 (“Only a Government body would be truly independent, provide le-
gitimacy and encourage wide membership.”).
193. See Draft Charter, supra note 11.
194. See id. § IX (D. 1-2).
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to bidding on government contracts; mandate participation in industry as-
sociations or activity-specific training requirements;195 establish effective
complaint procedures for victims of wrongdoing or their advocates; ensure
that hotlines and whistle-blower protections are in place; and maintain a
blacklist of offenders (corporate and individual). To promote the objective
of participation, all contracting firms eligible to apply for international se-
curity assignments would need to be in good standing with their local
LMO. To promote transparency, compliance information on specific com-
panies and the industry would be included in reports published by LMOs.
Companies, too—especially those of large scale—might be required to
formally file compliance reports, much as financial institutions and private
investment funds are required to file periodic reports on their activity.196
A core function of the LMOs would be to review and investigate com-
plaints against contracting firms and, importantly, individuals as well.
Though complaint mechanisms are an increasingly common feature of
global governance schemes,197 they were introduced only recently in the
private security and military industry. Several years ago, for example, the
U.N. Working Group on Mercenaries developed a procedure allowing for
the submission of complaints “by a State, State organ, inter-governmental
and non-governmental organization (NGO), or the individuals concerned,
their families or their representatives, or any other relevant source.”198 As
part of this process, the U.N. Working Group makes recommendations to
companies, governments, the party that lodged the complaint and, eventu-
ally, to the Human Rights Council.199 These parties in turn must inform
the U.N. Working Group of any follow-up action taken based on its rec-
ommendations.200 The Charter201 and the U.N. Draft Convention202 con-
template similar arrangements. Setting aside the soft complaint reporting
mechanisms already in place at industry associations, it is clear that in the
future a robust complaint procedure will need to be established under
195. See, e.g., Armed Security Officer, VIRGINIA DEP’T OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERV.,
http://www.dcjs.virginia.gov/pss/howto/registrations/armedSecurityOfficer.cfm (last visited
Nov. 6, 2014) (describing that the Virginia Department of Criminal Justice Services has estab-
lished a regulatory regime applicable to private security services providers in the State of
Virginia, including detailed registration, training and licensing provisions).
196. See, e.g., Investment Advisers Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1–80b-21, 203–204 (1940);
Form ADV, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/answers/formadv.htm (last vis-
ited Nov. 6, 2014) (presenting the form investment advisors use to register with the SEC and
state securities authorities).
197. For this reason, efforts should be made to streamline the process under the pro-
posed model and avoid creating overlap with other national, regional or international
arrangements.
198. Office of the High Comm’r for Human Rights, Methods of Work, U.N. HUM. RTS.
¶ 17, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Mercenaries/WGMercenaries/Pages/MethodsWork.
aspx (last visited Nov. 6, 2014).
199. See id. ¶¶ 20-21.
200. See id. ¶ 22.
201. See Draft Charter, supra note 11, art. 13.
202. U.N. Draft Convention, supra note 133, art. 34.
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LMO auspices: one that will complement its monitoring, certification, and
verification responsibilities.203
The two-tiered structure I propose contemplates the referral of com-
plaints and findings of non-compliance to an international body author-
ized to investigate, sanction, or refer the situation to local or international
authorities. In the case of significant abuses, however, the referral hierar-
chy would be two-pronged: LMOs would have a responsibility to report
criminal wrongdoing to local law enforcement bodies as well.
Finally, in the spirit of the OECD’s Guidelines, and as suggested in
the Charter, domestic monitoring offices would also serve as a forum for
discussion between companies, industry associations, non-governmental
organizations, and government organs with a relevant interest in security
contracting, as well as a mechanism for dispute settlement.204
C. Sanctioning in the Proposed Model
By strengthening existing elements of soft accountability and intro-
ducing limited elements of hard accountability, the monitoring and sanc-
tioning model presented here enhances the self-regulatory regime
represented by the Montreux process and the ICoC. While the proposed
model foresees a much-expanded role for the LMOs above and beyond
that which is performed by industry groups today,205 the competence of
LMOs would remain primarily in the realm of soft accountability—
namely, making public announcements, publishing findings, performing
special reviews and certifying compliance with best practices or codes of
conduct.206 Cases deserving of sanction would be referred by the LMOs to
the international supervisory body that could issue sanctions in its own
right or involve domestic (or international) law enforcement bodies as ap-
propriate.207 Examples of behavior warranting sanction by the supervisory
body would include substandard compliance practices, a track record of
wrongdoing short of criminal activity, failure to remediate low standards
of conduct, or unethical practices. Such behavior might be punished by
expulsion or suspension from industry groups or a prohibition on further
contracting until improvements are shown. More severe cases, including
203. Like under the Charter of the ICoC, the right to file complaints with LMOs should
be granted to any party that has been wronged due to a violation. The right should not,
however, extend to “any other source” as contemplated under the U.N. Working Group
mechanism since doing so risks diluting the mechanism with unjustified or politicized com-
plaints. See Office of the High Comm’r for Human Rights, supra note 198)
204. See Draft Charter, supra note 11, art. 13.2.5.
205. In contrast with the OECD framework that has become more decentralized over
the years and has shifted influence from its international supervisory body to the local moni-
toring bodies, the proposed model maintains centralization at the international level.
206. Draft Charter, supra note 11, § D(4) (“If a Specific Compliance Review is com-
menced, the Mechanism may publicly identify the Member Company that is subject to the
review.” (emphasis added)). LMOs should also publicly announce the outcome of special
reviews.
207. Of course, the LMOs also have the capabilities and obligation to report clear crim-
inal behavior or widespread abuses to domestic law enforcement authorities.
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criminal wrongdoing, would be referred directly to law enforcement au-
thorities. Importantly, sanctioning would extend beyond private security
and military companies to individual contractors as well.
By entrusting the international supervisory body with near-exclusive
competence to impose hard sanctions, the model seeks to maximize over-
sight, clearly delineate responsibilities, enable the top-down harmoniza-
tion and internalization of standards across participating states, and ensure
an appropriate level of independence from governments.208 Like the
IASB or the OECD’s Investment Committee—but endowed with greater
sanctioning power—the international supervisory body would have a pol-
icy-making, consultative, and coordination mandate alongside its sanction-
ing and referral authority.
Which body is best suited to fulfill this important role? A natural
choice would be for the U.N. Working Group to serve as the international
monitoring, oversight, and sanctioning body of the industry.209 Part and
parcel of the United Nations, the U.N. Working Group has exclusive com-
petence within the U.N. system to deal with matters related to the private
security and military industry. Though for many years the U.N. Working
Group demonstrated a poor understanding of security outsourcing—its
very name, the U.N. Working Group on Mercenaries, reveals its shortcom-
ings—it has since shown innovation and an appreciation for the unique
status of private security and military companies (which, as I have noted,
are no longer regarded as falling within the definition of “merce-
naries”).210 The U.N. Working Group’s current complaint mechanism,
which can be triggered by filling in a questionnaire available on its web-
site, demonstrates an appreciation for the centrality of complaint proce-
dures to the enforcement of industry standards.211 A vastly enhanced
complaint mechanism, together with well-defined supervisory and policy-
making functions, would allow the U.N. Working Group to develop into
the contemplated international supervisory body, atop a hierarchy that
builds on the monitoring, investigatory, and referral work of LMOs.212
208. The proposed model also gives greater competence to local monitoring offices to
determine whether a violation of industry-wide standards or company procedures has taken
place—a determination that should ideally come in the form of a straightforward and public
decision. Except for a potential referral to local law enforcement authorities, sanctions would
be imposed at the international level, not at the local level.
209. While making this suggestion, I would like to call for caution. Only very recently
did the Working Group concede to the idea that the law should treat mercenaries and private
military contractors differently. Previously, the Working Group advocated a ban of private
military contractors (I analyzed the evolution of the U.N. position on this subject at length in
Richemond-Barak, supra note 21). I would therefore recommend to wait and see how the
Working Group handles its new “communications” system, and how it interacts with the
industry in this context. At the moment, based on conversations with U.N. officials, this
mechanism has seldom been used and data on its use is presently unavailable.
210. See Richemond-Barak, supra note 21, at 1043–46.
211. See Office of the High Comm’r for Human Rights, supra note 198, (C)(1), ¶ 16.
212. This suggestion is consistent with the suggestion made during the UK’s Consulta-
tion on Promoting High Standards of Conduct by Private Military and Security Companies
(PMSCs) Internationally) to establish an international secretariat competent to hear com-
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Another potential candidate to act as the industry’s international su-
pervisory body, though less compelling than the U.N. Working Group, is
the Committee on the Regulation, Oversight, and Monitoring of Private
Military Companies (the Committee) contemplated in the United Nations’
draft international treaty governing the private security and military indus-
try (Draft Convention).213 Unfortunately, at this stage the Committee’s
regulatory potential appears rather limited. The submission of individual
and group petitions to the Committee is subject to the special consent of
states.214 The Draft Convention also fails to indicate what type of sanc-
tions, if any, the Committee would be able to impose at the outcome of the
various review procedures contemplated.215 Finally and more generally,
the state-centric approach216 adopted by the U.N. Draft Convention sits
uneasily with the participatory nature of emerging regulatory schemes.217
Returning to the nature of sanctions in the proposed model, and as
noted above, most emerging regulatory schemes in the international secur-
ity industry do not contemplate sanctions. 218 When they do, sanctions are
plaints and impose sanctions (such as placing additional conditions on the company’s con-
tract, issuing official warnings on a public website, obligating the company to pay a fine, or
suspending or removing the company from the entire initiative). See supra note 192, at 10–11.
213. See U.N. Draft Convention, supra note 133. Composed of experts of high moral
standing, its main role would consist in reviewing periodical reports submitted by state par-
ties on “the legislative, judicial, administrative or other measures which they have adopted
and which give effect to the provisions of this Convention.” (Art. 31) Following its considera-
tion of states’ reports, the Committee would then be able to make suggestions and general
recommendations and request further information. Importantly, these reports would be
made available to all state parties, and states “shall make their reports widely available to the
public in their own countries.” (Article 32) More problematic (and seemingly redundant with
the role of the U.N. Working Group) is the competence of the Committee to hear interstate
complaints. (Article 34) This mechanism, which exists under most human rights treaties but
has not proved particularly helpful, would be activated only between two state parties that
have both consented to it by making a declaration to that effect. The Draft Convention does
not elaborate on the type of decision the Committee can make as part of the interstate com-
plaint process.
214. See id., art. 37.
215. This is surprising given that the Draft Convention’s declared objective is to “estab-
lish and implement mechanisms to monitor the activities of PMSCs and violations of interna-
tional human rights and humanitarian law, in particular any illegal or arbitrary use of force
committed by PMSCs, to prosecute the perpetrators and to provide effective remedies for
the victims.”  See Draft Convention, supra note 133, Article 1(1)(e).
216. This is true even though the Convention applies to states and intergovernmental
organizations on an equal footing (Art. 3 provides that “State Parties” includes both), and
under Article 41 companies, industry associations, and other non-state actors may “commu-
nicate their support” to the Draft Convention by writing to the Secretary-General of the
United Nations, and intergovernmental organizations have a right to vote in the meetings of
the state parties (Art. 42); see also U.N. Draft Convention, supra note 133, ¶ 44.
217. The approach of the U.N. Draft Convention stands in stark contrast with the ap-
proach taken by the U.N. Working Group—whose complaint procedure is opened to states,
state organs, intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, individuals, and “any
other relevant source”—and with the multi-stakeholder approach of the Montreux process.
218. See supra note 11.
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either too lenient or directed exclusively at corporations.219 Under the
new model, the international body’s sanctioning arsenal would extend to
the imposition of remedial measures (to be monitored by the local LMO),
expulsion from industry associations, prohibition from participation in ten-
ders for a period of time, imposition of fines,220 and payment of damages
to victims. Companies could also be required, depending on the circum-
stances, to issue a private or public apology. When an individual contrac-
tor would be found to have violated internal or international regulations,
he could be stripped of benefits, fired, or banned from working in the
industry. But these sanctions, while important, do not suffice. Legal action
by judicial authorities constitutes a more effective sanction (and deter-
rent). Under the proposed model, the competence to refer cases to appro-
priate national, regional or international courts and tribunals would be
granted to the international supervisory body (alongside LMOs in very
serious cases).221 Here again, the U.N. Working Group could provide the
robust institutional backdrop needed to implement an efficient referral
system.
Overall, the two-tiered proposed model would significantly broaden
the arsenal of sanctions, both soft and hard, against non-compliant actors.
These sanctions, as I have repeatedly emphasized, must be contemplated
at all levels of the contractual chain. Though the threat of more serious
sanctions may raise some objections, perhaps the impetus created in re-
cent years around self-regulatory schemes would succeed in fostering ap-
proval for a mechanism with more teeth. Even if it does not, just
broadening the range of soft sanctions would carry significant weight in
helping the industry complete its path toward effective governance. To
summarize, the main features of the proposed regulatory model, which
incorporates the existing self-regulatory mechanism already in place, can
be outlined as follows:
(1) Monitoring:
• At the company level: codes of conduct, disciplinary measures,
hotlines, complaint mechanisms, referral to law enforcement of
criminal activity;
• At the industry level: industry associations, complaint mechanisms;
and
• At the regional level, by Local Monitoring Offices (LMOs): moni-
toring and reporting on industry trends, certification of companies,
219. See supra Draft Charter, supra note 11, § IX (F)(2)(b); see also ISOA Code of
Conduct, supra note 11, § 14.2.
220. See Minutes of the ICoC Working Group #3 Meeting: June 27, 2011, supra note 17
(providing more details on the suggestion).
221. As noted above, such a referral is actually contemplated under the Voluntary Prin-
ciples—an initiative supported by the leading buyers of private military services, including
the United States and the U.K. See supra note 20. Referral by the contracting state to investi-
gative authorities is also contemplated in the Montreux Document. Montreux Document,
supra note 5, art. 20.
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verification of compliance, investigations, naming and shaming, re-
ferrals to the international supervisory body, forums for discussion
and policy making among stakeholders, light mechanisms for dis-
pute settlement,222 referral to law enforcement of criminal activity.
(2) Sanctioning at the international level by a body supervising the work
of LMOs and capable of imposing sanctions against:
• Companies: fines, reparations, suspension or expulsion from indus-
try associations and industry schemes, public or private apology,
referral to national, regional, or international authorities;
• Contractors: removal of benefits, termination of employment, pro-
hibition to work in the industry, referral to national, regional, or
international authorities; and
• State or other hiring entity: investigation and referral for prosecu-
tion of representatives or officials.
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR GLOBAL GOVERNANCE
Beyond the insights it offers on self-regulation in the private security
and military industry, this Article sheds light on some of the newest trends
in global governance. In an area of the law traditionally shaped by and
addressed to states, non-state actors have joined states to create regulation
that applies to both. The cooperation is novel, and its outcome raises a
broad array of questions. Has the private security and military industry
discovered a “new way of law” (to paraphrase Slaughter and Burke-
White)?223
Other industries have recognized the potential of self-regulation—
take the IASB or the Basel Committee in the financial sector. Though
questions remain, particularly after the global financial crisis, the banking
industry insists that regulation will not work unless it is involved in its
making. The perfect balance between public and private authority may not
have been found but the regulatory shift is irreversible.
The experience of the private security and military industry confirms
that law making can no longer be envisaged as an exclusively public activ-
ity—not even in the realm of international humanitarian law, which has
traditionally been off limits to private actors. It also demonstrates that, in
certain circumstances, conceiving of law as a public-private partnership
may have distinct advantages, particularly in enhancing compliance. But
what would this expanded conception of law making mean for the role of
the state as sole law maker? More broadly, what would it mean for the
theory of sources as traditionally understood in international law? In this
Section, I address some of the broader implications of the industry’s expe-
rience for global governance.
222. I would recommend that mediation processes should be non-binding and not in-
clude the imposition of ‘hard’ sanctions. This should be left to the international supervisory
body. However, mediators could be competent to determine whether a violation has oc-
curred—and, most importantly, should keep a tedious and public record of these violations.
223. See Anne-Marie Slaughter & William Burke-White, The Future of International
Law is Domestic (or, The European Way of Law), 47 HARVARD INT’L L.J. 327 (2006).
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A. The Role of the State
Law making traditionally constitutes the prerogative of the state. Law
making may take place at the domestic level, through the legislative or
executive branch, or at the international level by way of the state’s ratifica-
tion of treaties. The state, and only the state, may participate in the latter.
In contrast, self-regulation involves a sharing of public authority with pri-
vate actors—a notion foreign to the theory of sources in international law.
Though it challenges the marginal role played by non-state actors in inter-
national law and international law making, the experience of the private
security and military industry shows that non-state participation in law
making does hold certain benefits. Acknowledging that non-state actors
play a growing role in international law making, particularly in the contro-
versial area of humanitarian law, does not necessarily deny any role to the
state. As scholars have noted, a measure of state involvement may en-
hance the impact of self-regulatory schemes.224 The difficulty lies in
achieving the optimal balance between public and private authority, and
the experience of the private security and military industry provides a per-
tinent example of how this balance may be achieved.
Experts in regulation have envisaged numerous ways in which the ex-
ercise of public authority may be combined or reconciled with self-regula-
tion—some of which have inspired the proposed model. Ian Ayres and
John Braithwaite developed the concept of “enforced self-regulation,”225
where states become involved mainly at the monitoring and enforcing
stages. Enforced self-regulation is appealing because it “combines the ver-
satility and flexibility of voluntary self-regulation, but avoids many of the
inherent weaknesses of voluntarism.”226 In this type of regulatory regime,
companies write rules in consultation with, or under general guidelines
established by, the government. Independent compliance groups estab-
lished within the companies then conduct enforcement. 227 The role of the
government is to control the independence of this internal compliance
mechanism and to ensure that violations of rules are punishable by law.228
The proposed model borrows from enforced regulation by entrusting
a level of enforcement and sanctioning authority to private bodies. This
feature exists in banking regulation: for example, U.S. Federal law granted
the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) the power to disci-
pline firms and individuals in the securities industry who violate FINRA
224. See Gunningham & Rees supra note 15, at 396 (discussing the need to “comple-
ment self-regulation with some form of government and third-party involvement”).
225. See IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION 35 (1992); see
also John Braithwaite, Enforced Self-Regulation: A New Strategy for Corporate Crime Con-
trol, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1466 (1982).
226. See AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 225, at 106; Braithwaite, supra note 225, at
1470.
227. See supra note 190, at 10–11.
228. See Braithwaite, supra note 225, at 1470–71.
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rules.229 In the accounting industry, the wholesale adoption of IFRS into
law by certain states (notably E.U. countries) provides a similar, though
structurally different, example. 230
The proposed model also borrows from “orchestrated regulation,” a
type of scheme characterized by governments’ promoting, encouraging,
and backing up emerging self-regulatory schemes:
“Orchestration includes a wide range of directive and facilitative
measures designed to convene, empower, support, and steer pub-
lic and private actors engaged in regulatory activities.”231
According to its promoters, orchestration can “enhance the impact, legiti-
macy, and public interest orientation” of self-regulatory frameworks by
promoting and encouraging them.232 Some government oversight contrib-
utes not only to greater legitimacy but also to greater transparency, partic-
ipation, and accountability—themes that echo the analysis in Part II.233
Under this type of scheme, states convene private actors to take part in
multi-stakeholder schemes, disseminate information on high-quality initia-
tives, and promote industry standards by adhering to them in their own
operations.
Industry schemes should incorporate more of these features. Just as
states played a role in initiating self-regulation, they should become in-
volved at the sanctioning stage. There is little doubt that the involvement
of public actors (primarily Switzerland) 234 in initiating self-regulation in
the private security and military industry endowed the Montreux Docu-
ment and the ICoC with the legitimacy they needed to flourish. A similar
infusion of public authority could and should also take place at the sanc-
tioning stage—that is, when a local LMO or the international supervisory
body determines that a referral to national, regional, or international au-
thorities is warranted. The proposed model places an emphasis on this
novel and important aspect.
229. See generally IFRS, Jurisdiction Profiles, FINANCIAL INDUSTRY REGULATORY AU-
THORITY, http://www.finra.org (last visited Nov. 6, 2014).
230. See http://www.ifrs.org/Use-around-the-world/Pages/Jurisdiction-profiles.aspx.
231. See Kenneth Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Strengthening International Regulation
Through Transnational New Governance: Overcoming the Orchestration Deficit, 42 VANDER-
BILT J. INT’L L. 501, 532 (2009). See also Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation
and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 Minn. L. Rev. 262, 265
(2004).
232. See id. at 510.
233. See id. at 558 (noting that orchestration “could prescribe substantive principles and
procedures derived from public law to reinforce transparency and accountability, enhancing
the legitimacy of private schemes . . . Orchestration could modulate the composition, struc-
ture, and procedures of private schemes to maximize their participatory and deliberative
character and public interest orientation. It could empower weaker and more diffuse groups
in internal decision making, assist them in participating, and act on their behalf when
necessary.”).
234. See supra note 33.
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Notwithstanding their role in initiating, supporting, and promoting
regulation, however, it is important to concede that states have lost their
status as the sole lawmakers and enforcers in the areas of war and secur-
ity—as in so many other areas of international law.235 Increasingly de-
prived of their sacrosanct monopoly on the use of force, states have also
lost much of their monopoly over the regulation of force.236 Non-state ac-
tors ranging from international organizations and courts to non-govern-
mental organizations, industry and civil society increasingly see
themselves—and are seen by states—as having the legitimacy to adjudi-
cate, influence or weigh in on matters of war and security.237 With the
involvement of civil society and the private sector in the regulation of se-
curity and military outsourcing, we witness the emergence of more “hy-
brid” sources of law—a term appropriately coined by Anthea Roberts and
Sandy Sivakumaran.238 Just as a broader array of protagonists wages war,
a broader array of actors participates in the process of regulating war.239
And we should not be surprised when novel non-state and hybrid initia-
tives, such as self-regulatory schemes, gain traction.
The role of the state in contemporary regulatory processes governing
private war and security represents a marked departure from the reality of
only a few decades ago, when states were the sole participants in the inter-
national system and had a virtual monopoly over international law mak-
ing.240 The Montreux process illustrates this quite well. Though initiated
and elaborated by states and non-state actors working together on an
equal footing, the framework itself applies primarily to companies.241 As a
whole, the role of states in the Montreux scheme remains limited: like civil
society organizations, states are eligible for membership if they so request
and provided they meet a number of conditions.242 Their affiliation, in
235. See, e.g., INFORMAL INTERNATIONAL LAW-MAKING (Joost Pauwelyn, Ramses A
Wessel, & Jan Wouters, eds., 2012).
236. See THOMSON JANICE, MERCENARIES, PIRATES & SOVEREIGNS (1994) (discussing
the evolution of state control over violence).
237. For example, the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict
in Georgia established by the Council of Europe and the Bahrain Independent Commission
of Inquiry established by Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa, the King of Bahrain, to investigate the
incidents that occurred during the period of unrest in Bahrain in early 2011 and the conse-
quences of these events. See, e.g., The Report of the Bahrain Independent Commission of
Inquiry, BAHRAIN INDEPENDENT COMMISSION OF INQUIRY (Nov. 23, 2011), http://
www.bici.org.bh.
238. See Janice, supra note 236.
239. See Rianne Mahon & Stephen Mc Bride, Standardizing and Disseminating Knowl-
edge: The Role of the OECD in Global Governance, 1 EUR. POL. SCI. REV. 83, 87 (2009)
(“This does not mean that nation states have disappeared. They remain as key decision
points, though they make policy in a context increasingly shaped by multiple and overlapping
transnational networks.”).
240. International humanitarian law is still defined as consisting of treaties and custom-
ary law—that is, state-made law. See, e.g., MARCO SASSOLI, ANTOINE A. BOUVIER & ANNE
QUINTIN, HOW DOES LAW PROTECT IN WAR, Ch. 4 (ICRC 2011).
241. See Montreux Document, supra note 5, Preface.
242. See Draft Charter, supra note 11, art. 3.3.2.
Summer 2014] Can Self-Regulation Work? 819
other words, is neither automatic nor indispensable to the proper function-
ing of the self-regulatory scheme.
B. Compliance and Normativity in Global Governance
These developments challenge not only the role of the state as law
maker, but also our understanding of compliance as it pertains to non-
state actors under international law. Measuring the impact of emerging
self-regulatory schemes on compliance using empirical tools is virtually
impossible for many reasons: causality is simply too diffuse; quantifying
the number of violations relative to the number of contractors deployed at
any given time would require knowledge of contractor numbers (which
vary over time) and contractor abuses (which tend to be unreported by
victims and companies); the media, public awareness and other external
factors have affected contractor behavior and self-perception (and corpo-
rate reporting on bad behavior); and self-regulatory schemes have simply
been around for too little time in the industry.
But the impact of self-regulation can be measured in other, palpable
ways. Since becoming involved in regulatory processes, private security
and military companies have shown more deference to the legal
frameworks applicable to their activities—broad adherence to the ICoC
Code is the clearest evidence of this.243 As we have seen, corporate in-
volvement in the regulatory process has affected the security industry’s
perception of the law. From being an “addressee” of the law (and only
tangentially, as international law is aimed primarily at states), the private
security sector has gained the ability to influence the content of the law.
Viewing this favorably, the industry has become more willing to cooperate
with states.
Perhaps surprisingly, the industry’s participation in self-regulatory ini-
tiatives law has not been coupled with any perceptible challenge to the
applicable standards. In fact, the standards and best practices developed
jointly by the public and the private sector often go further than the law
itself.244 The Montreux Document, for example, sets forth “best practices”
guiding the conduct of states and other actors, not “minimal require-
ments,” and the private sector has welcomed these developments.245 Par-
ticipation, in other words, has endowed joint regulatory efforts with
greater legitimacy and has become self-reinforcing:
[T]he complex process of interaction by which norms are created,
interpreted, and elaborated enhances their legitimacy and
strengthens their claim to obedience. The basic reason is simple; it
becomes harder for a member company to reject a norm after
treating it seriously and at length in industry deliberations.246
243. See supra note 34.
244. See HAUFLER, supra note 17, at 8 (demonstrating that is consistent with the nature
of self-regulation, which is to beyond the law).
245. See supra note 25.
246. See Gunningham & Rees, supra note 15, at 379.
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Self-regulation has indeed established a strong “claim to obedience” in
international security contracting.247 The elaboration of industry standards
as part of an inclusive regulatory process bringing together all major in-
dustry players has triggered a tangible pull toward internalization and
compliance.248 Although this pull toward compliance cannot be fully
quantified, it manifests itself in how the industry approaches regulation,
expresses support for emerging regulatory schemes, and participates in
regulatory initiatives.249
Companies signal their support for self-regulation on their websites
and in claims of fidelity to industry best practices (over 700 are ICoC sig-
natories).250 They have also revised their codes of conduct to align them
with the ICoC.251 The main industry association has itself amended its
code of conduct to include the ICoC in the list of “rules of international
humanitarian law and human rights law” members must honor.252 En-
hancing compliance is the central objective of the Swiss multi-stakeholder
initiative.253 In fact, following the Montreux Document’s endorsement by
the United Nations and industry associations,254 the hope was expressed
that the Montreux Document would be incorporated in companies’ codes
247. Skeptics would remark that signing on to the ICoC by no means implies greater
compliance, which companies sign on to avoid peer pressure and reap the benefits of joining
in, and that the entire scheme is no more than mere window dressing. Most importantly, they
would argue that it is impossible to verify whether “signing on” actually enhances compli-
ance. As I have explained earlier, even if it were feasible (it cannot be excluded that data
might become available in the future on the impact of self-regulation on internal investiga-
tions and/or on non-compliance reporting to industry associations) measuring the normative
outcome of self-regulation empirically would not necessarily provide an accurate account of
compliance. (See “Introduction” of this Article). Empirical studies cannot fully account for
the complexity of normative effectiveness or compliance, and performance indicators are
difficult to establish. In the oil and gas industry, in matters not exclusively related to security,
Key Performance Indicators are presently being developed based on the Voluntary Princi-
ples, the Montreux Document, and the ICoC.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. See, e.g., OLIVEGROUP, http://www.olivegroup.com/ (last visited Nov. 6, 2014);
HART SECURITY, http://www.hartsecurity.com/ (last visited Nov. 6, 2014); NEPTUNE MARI-
TIME SECURITY, http://www.neptunemaritimesecurity.com/ (last visited Nov. 6, 2014).
251. See supra note 95.
252. ISOA Code of Conduct, supra note 11, pmbl.
253. Minutes of the IcoC Working Group #3 Meeting: June 27, 2011, supra note 15 (not-
ing that “participation ultimately leads to better practice.”). On the advantages of multi-
stakeholder arrangements on compliance, see Abbott & Snidal, supra note 231, at 526 (argu-
ing, inter alia, that multi-stakeholder arrangements allow actors to reach more balanced stan-
dards that are more easily implemented, promote participation, and empower social actors).
254. Cockayne, supra note 47, at 402, 427 (noting that the Montreux Document “has
the potential to provide the basis for other forms of more enforceable regulation, such as
contract, national law or regional law or broader instruments and implementation arrange-
ments” and “seems poised, therefore, to provide a set of generally respected standards on
which other regulatory initiatives might be built.”).
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of conduct and perhaps even, one day, in an international convention.255
The progress in compliance and “claims to obedience” (to quote Gun-
nigham and Reese) over the past several years has doubtless gone beyond
that which was imagined possible at the time of the Montreux Document’s
adoption.256
Interestingly, the non-binding nature of emerging regulatory schemes
does not appear to have hindered the path to internalization. On the con-
trary, the industry’s experience arguably provides a casebook example of
circumstances where non-binding agreements have achieved more than
have binding ones. Non-binding instruments are generally more palatable
to states, quicker to elaborate, less costly politically and financially, and
most useful “when states are unsure about what they can feasibly
implement.”257
The experience of the international private security and military in-
dustry provides a vivid example that “hard” law is only one way of en-
hancing compliance.258 With each publicized industry abuse, from Abu
Ghraib to numerous other incidents implicating contractors, 259 calls for
stronger regulation grew. But the complexity of the industry, its global and
changing nature, and the wide variety of private, governmental and inter-
national actors involved, made the prospect of “hard” law uncertain. Non-
binding self-regulation and multi-stakeholder initiatives are the only law-
making processes that effectively gained ground—casting doubt on the
very necessity of “hard” law and advocating for a broader view of compli-
ance.260 Though imperfect, the normative regime that emerged in the past
255. In the wake of the Montreux Document’s adoption, the United Nations began to
draft a treaty regulating private war and security. See U.N. Draft Convention, supra note 133.
256. See Peter W. Singer, War, Profits, and the Vacuum of Law: Privatized Military
Firms and International Law, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 521 (2004).
257. See Raustiala, supra note 125 (Compliance. . .) at 423–24, 426; see also, Charles
Lipson, Why are International Agreements Informal?, 45 INT’L ORG. 495, 501 (1991) (noting
that the reasons for choosing informal agreements include the desire to avoid formal and
visible pledges, the desire to avoid ratification, the ability to renegotiate or modify as circum-
stances change, or the need to reach agreements quickly).
258. See, e.g., COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE: THE ROLE OF NON-BINDING NORMS IN
THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM (Dinah Shelton, ed. 2000); see also Kal Raustiala, Form
and Substance in International Agreements, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 581, 586–7, 590 (2005) (arguing
that “[t]here is no such thing as “soft-law” “because “state practice is inconsistent with the
continuous or spectrum view of legality in agreements” and because the fact that “many non-
binding commitments ultimately influence state behavior illustrates the complexity of world
politics, not the legal character of those commitments.”); see also Raustiala, supra note 125,
426.
259. See supra Part III.B.3. See, for example, Security Firm Cleared by US Army, BBC
News (June 14, 2006) (the UK faced outrage after the 2005 circulation of a “trophy video” on
the Internet showing Aegis employees randomly shooting at civilians from the back of their
vehicle on the road to Baghdad airport but the contractors were found by the US Army’s
Criminal Investigation Division not to have not overstepped the company’s guidelines on the
use of force); and G4S ‘Warned’ Over Killer Security Guard Danny Fitzsimons, BBC (Oct.1,
2012) (security contractor killed two in 2009 shooting in Baghad).
260. Raustiala, supra note 125, at 439 (“[L]ooking beyond compliance to the evaluation
of effectiveness, particularly in the context of international law, yields many benefits. Legal
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decade has clarified the legal and moral environment within which private
security companies operate.
This will not be the first time that “less is more” in the realm of
normativity.261 I have argued elsewhere that normative ambiguity may, at
times, produce satisfactory outcomes.262 In an analysis of norms governing
unilateral humanitarian intervention, I showed why the codification of a
norm dealing with unilateral humanitarian intervention may be less desira-
ble, from a normative standpoint, than the ambiguous normative status
quo.263 Just as an ambiguous legal regime may at times offer advantages
over a strictly delineated one, informal means of regulation may at times
offer advantages over more formal ones.
The regulatory schemes in question illustrate this idea quite well. They
point to the intrinsic value of self-regulation—beyond its ability to become
hard law.264 They demonstrate that a non-binding and voluntary regime is
not necessarily weak or inefficient.265 While the effectiveness of informal
means of cooperation among states has been acknowledged,266 their po-
tential seems even more apparent when non-states are involved. Normaliz-
ing the behavior of non-state actors can be challenging. The laws of war
have struggled with this particular issue for over a decade.267 Informal,
scholarship’s prevailing focus on compliance obscures these benefits. Only by understanding
the limits of compliance, and how compliance and effectiveness interact, can we move toward
both richer, deeper analysis and more productive, effective international law.”).
261. See Prosper Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in International Law? 77 AM.
J.INT’L L. 413, 413 (1983) (arguing against a hierarchy of normativity); see also Dinah
Shelton, Normative Hierarchy in International Law, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 291, 319 (2006).
262. See Daphne´ Richemond, Normativity in International Law: The Case for Unilateral
Humanitarian Intervention, 6 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV’T L.J. 45, 45 (2003) (addressing the
question of whether there should be norms to govern unilateral humanitarian intervention).
263. I define unilateral humanitarian intervention as “a military intervention under-
taken by a state (or a group of states) outside the umbrella of the United Nations in order to
secure human rights in another country.” Id. at 47.
264. See Gupta & Lad, supra note 16, at 416–17 (presenting a similar view and noting
that self-regulation and stakeholder participation may produce similar or better results than
direct regulation by the government “either alone or in conjunction with direct regulation by
the government” and that, as such, self-regulation may “supplement or complement” govern-
mental regulation). For the opposite view, see JOHN KIRTON & MICHAEL TREBILCOCK,
HARD CHOICES, SOFT LAW: VOLUNTARY STANDARDS IN GLOBAL TRADE, ENVIRONMENT
AND SOCIAL GOVERNANCE 12 (2004) (noting that much of the value of soft law mechanisms
is that they may lead to eventual hard law commitments that can be effectively enforced). On
this point, see also Abbott and & Snidal, supra note 231, at 531 (elaborating Kirton & Trebil-
cock’s view).
265. During the elaboration of the U.N. Draft Convention on Private Military and Se-
curity Companies, certain states reportedly “raised the opinion that the treaty may not be the
most effective way of improving oversight and accountability for the industry.” See U.N.
Draft Convention, supra note 133, ¶ 73.
266. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Real New World Order, 76 FOREIGN AFF. 183, 190
(1991).
267. For an overview of the challenges, see Cherif Bassiouni, The New Wars and the
Crisis of Compliance with the Law of Armed Conflict by Non-State Actors, 98 J. Crim. L. &
Criminology 711 (2008); and Marco Sasso`li, Taking Armed Groups Seriously: Ways to Im-
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voluntary and non-binding tools offer interesting avenues for the regula-
tion of non-state actors—including, but not only, in the conduct of war. 268
Normatively, the by-product of this evolution is a different type of law
altogether: produced by less formal mechanisms, not the result of the exer-
cise of public authority, written by non-state actors, and not legally bind-
ing.269 Salzman has characterized such “law” as “actions which operate
below the radar screen of what we normally consider to be ‘lawmaking’
activities but may significantly influence agency activities.” 270 This new
“law” is measured by “the weight to be given to a norm or decision.”271
The question inevitably arises whether multi-stakeholder initiatives
such as the Montreux Document or the ICoC might ever be characterized
as law. In the context of global governance, the answer is probably yes.
Global administrative law conceives of rule making at the global level “not
in the form of treaties negotiated by states, but of standards and rules of
general applicability adopted by subsidiary bodies.”272 Though global gov-
ernance produces non-binding and non-coercive regulation, it does fulfill a
regulatory function akin to law.273 As a result, “[t]he next generation of
international institutions is also likely to look more like the Basle Commit-
tee, or, more formally, the Organization of Economic Cooperation and
Development, dedicated to providing a forum for transnational problem-
solving and the harmonization of national law.”274 As in other contexts,
global, voluntary, and hybrid regulatory schemes have contributed to solv-
ing the legal uncertainties that permeated the private security and military
industry only a few years back. But the use of these schemes raises many
questions of international legal theory.
Scholars have discussed the implications and precise nature of a grow-
ing body of informal international regulation in a variety of contexts,
prove their Compliance with International Humanitarian Law, 1 J. INT’L HUMAN. LEGAL
STUD. 5 (2010), available at http://www.cdp-hrc.uottawa.ca/uploads/TakingArmedGroups
Seriously.pdf.
268. See Steven Ratner, Law Promotion Beyond Law Talk: The Red Cross, Persuasion,
and the Laws of War, 22 EUR. J. INT’L L. 487, 499 (2011) (arguing that “as international
practice expands the universe of legal duty-holders, current approaches to compliance need
to broader their ambit to consider how and why these actors comply” and that “achieving
compliance with the law does not necessitate a conversation laden with law.”); see also Benja-
min Perrin, Promoting Compliance of Private Security and Military Companies with Interna-
tional Humanitarian Law, 88 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 613, 634 (2006).
269. James Salzman, Decentralized Administrative Law in the Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development, 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 189, 218 (2005).
270. Id.
271. See Benedict Kingsbury, The Concept of ‘Law’ in Global Administrative Law, 20
EUR.J.INT’L L. 23, 27 (2009) (emphasis added).
272. See Kingsbury et al., supra note 9, at 17.
273. See Slaughter, supra note 266, at 192.
274. See id. at 196.
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though rarely in the context of humanitarian law.275 A notable exception,
Roberts and Sivakumaran have highlighted the role played by armed
groups in shaping international humanitarian law—and the implications
these developments have on international law’s theory of sources. Law
making in the private security and military industry provides another ex-
ample of the emergence of “hybrid sources of law,” defined by Roberts
and Sivakumaran as law “concluded between subjects with recognized
lawmaking capacities” and “ones without.”276 Moreover, the question
arises as to whether “hybrid” industry standards and practices embodied
in instruments like the Montreux Document and the ICoC—and like those
drawn up by armed groups—could one day crystallize into customary in-
ternational law.277
The question of whether a new theory of sources is necessary to ac-
count for these changes is beyond the scope of this Article. But I do hope
that its insights, particularly when analyzed in conjunction with Roberts
and Sivakumaran’s innovative analysis of the emergence of “quasi-cus-
tom,”278 will trigger a genuine discussion of the role played by non-state
actors in international (humanitarian) law making. Like the phenomenon
identified by Roberts and Sivakumaran, the emergence of self-regulatory
frameworks in the private security and military industry provides an exam-
ple of the involvement of non-state actors in humanitarian law making.
The involvement of intergovernmental organizations, NGOs, and corpora-
tions in regulatory processes is arguably less controversial than that of
armed groups. And in the case of the private security and military indus-
try, as noted above, the state does maintain a level of involvement in the
process. In spite of these differences, the two phenomena both raise the
question of whether the “hybrid” and non-binding instruments produced
qualify as “norms” under international law and of the normative nature of
the fragmented, disorderly and decentralized outcome produced. Non-
state-made-law affects the substance of international humanitarian law in
tangible and irreversible ways. It is time for international scholars to take
full measure of the involvement of non-state actors in international law
making and address the important theoretical questions and policy dilem-
mas it raises.
Let me be clear: involving non-state actors in law making may not
always be desirable or possible. This should be determined on a case-by-
275. See generally Paul Stephan, Privatizing International Law, 97 VA. L. REV. 1573
(2011) (discussing the increasing role played by private actors in international lawmaking);
see also INFORMAL INTERNATIONAL LAW-MAKING, supra note 235.
276. See Roberts & Sivakumaran, supra note 12, at 144.
277. Kingsbury et al., supra note 9, at 29 (expressing the view that “[c]ustomary interna-
tional law is still generally understood as being formed primarily by state action, and thus for
the time being does not fully incorporate the relevant practice of non-state actors, such as
global administrative bodies”). For a discussion of whether customary international law may
reflect the practice of actors other than states, see id. at 149–51 (developing the notion of
“quasi-custom”).
278. See Roberts & Sivakumaran, supra note 12, at 149–51.
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case basis, depending on the type of non-state actor and the area of law
considered. But what the private security and military industry illustrates
is that at least in some circumstances, participation in international law
making holds promise for legitimacy, compliance, and the harmonization
and internalization of standards.
CONCLUSION
The past decade has seen the emergence of a broad array of self-regu-
latory schemes applicable to the private security and military industry. The
experience of the industry shows how a disorderly, multi-layered, non-
binding, voluntary, and decentralized framework developed by a variety of
public and private actors has affected the moral and legal environment in
which the industry operates.279 Measuring this impact is as difficult as it is
important.280 Because compliance levels cannot be measured empirically
at this stage, the Article uses benchmarks developed by global governance
scholars to assess the normative outcome of the emerging regulatory
framework.
With the help of these benchmarks, this Article provides a more accu-
rate and precise picture of the normative outcomes produced by self-regu-
lation than any assessment conducted so far. Instead of an all-too-common
sweeping criticism against self-regulation, it offers a blueprint for the insti-
tutionalization of compliance in the industry—keeping self-regulation as
its core. The issue is not, as critics would have it, that the industry should
not or cannot regulate itself. Rather it is the opposite: there is nothing
inherently wrong with self-regulation, and it can be more effective than
formal governance in certain circumstances, particularly if the objective is
to affect the behavior of non-state actors.
The weakness of the emerging self-regulatory framework rests in two
principal areas. First, the emerging framework is, for the most part, limited
to corporate accountability. In order to truly ensure compliance with in-
dustry standards, a bottom-up strategy directed at individual contractors
must take shape. Such a strategy would create positive and direct incen-
tives by making individuals personally accountable for bad behavior. The
industry is well positioned to lead such an initiative, but much will depend
on the applicable sanctioning regime. The second weakness of the emerg-
ing self-regulatory framework is that none of the existing schemes contem-
plate the imposition of sanctions beyond the mere exclusion or suspension
of non-compliant actors.281
279. See generally Cockayne, supra note 47; see also Interview with Peter Singer, Direc-
tor of the Brookings Institute (Mar. 28, 2006) (on file with author) (saying that growing
awareness of the activities of private military contractors has had an impact on companies
which are more careful today than in the 1990s, for example in how they recruit).
280. See HAUFLER supra note 17, at 118 (discussing the various ways of measuring the
success of self-regulation).
281. Certain schemes contemplate the reentry of excluded members after time has
passed; others do not contemplate sanctions at all. See supra note 11.
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Building on the Charter of the Oversight Mechanism for the Interna-
tional Code of Conduct for Private Security Providers and the OECD
framework, the proposed model establishes a dual level of control: at the
local level through LMOs entrusted with monitoring, and at the interna-
tional level through an international sanctioning body primarily focused
on sanctioning. The proposed model would thus address the two main sub-
stantive weaknesses of the emerging self-regulatory framework (limited
sanctions and a focus on corporate accountability), while at the same time
providing structure and formality to what has hitherto been a piecemeal
process of regulatory development.
In addition to providing practical and timely suggestions for improving
regulation in the industry, the present study highlighted the feasibility and
promise of engaging certain types of non-state actors in law making, par-
ticularly in the realm of war and security. The experience of the private
security and military industry shows that an inclusive regulatory process
translates into greater transparency and internationalization—the ingredi-
ents needed to enhance compliance. Clearly, not all non-state actors can
or should be engaged in law making. But in certain circumstances, as we
have seen, the involvement of non-state actors can create broad buy-in
and much-needed incentives for these actors to comply. As more non-state
actors play an active role on the international scene in general, and on the
modern battlefield in particular, and as the challenge of regulating their
behavior grows more acute, this study offers valuable insight on how it can
be accomplished. Beyond the participatory element, the Article also in-
troduces the idea of “soft law” in an area previously regulated by states
and through “hard law.” Though both participation and “soft law” have
been analyzed in great depth in other contexts, this Article brings to light
their contribution to the regulation of war and security.
Finally, the experience of the private security and military industry
contributes to the ongoing debate over optimal modes of regulation. Na-
tional regulation is often perceived as ill equipped to account for the com-
plexity of the market,282 international regulation can take time to shape
up, and regional regulation may not suit all relevant players.283 In the pri-
vate security and military industry, much creativity has been shown.
Though not perfect, the model it offers can help other industries assess the
benefits of self-regulation, work out the desired extent of governmental
involvement, and define the reach of accountability schemes.
282. This was the prevailing sentiment in the wake of the collapse of the Fortis bank.
The Belgium government could not be saved by the Belgium government unless the bank
agreed to limit its activities to Belgium proper.
283. The regulation of the financial sector has been entrusted to the European Central
Bank—a model closer to formal regulation, which initially caused anxiety within the banking
sector. See, e.g., Thomas Landan, Worried Banks Resist Fiscal Union, N. Y. TIMES (June 17,
2012), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/18/business/global/worried-banks-pose-
threat-to-push-for-financial-union.html?_r=0.
